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Abstract
This dissertation is the result of three years of experimentation and research
at General Electric Transportation Systems (GETS), Intelligent Control Systems,
division of Florence. In the early years of 2000 GETS decided to open to research
activities in order to introduce formal methods in the development cycle of railway
signalling solutions. For this purpose, it was decided to start a collaboration
with the University of Florence, in particular with the Computer Engineering
Department (D.S.I. - Dipartimento di Sistemi e Informatica). This work reports
the achievements of the research, the lesson learnt and, finally, the advantages
of the introduction of formal methods in GETS development cycle.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The industries are increasingly focusing on the adoption of formal and semi-formal
methods, including modeling technology, in the different stages of the develop-
ment of software products [7] [48] [47]. The Paris Metro [23], the SACEM system
[35], and the San Juan metro [43] are past and recent examples of successful
stories about the usage of these technologies in the railway domain. The use of
models allows to reach an abstraction level difficult to achieve when working with
hand-written code, and allows to grasp concepts that otherwise would be lost in
the early stages of development. The many benefits of this approach become
focal for the development of safety-critical systems, where having control of the
system that is being developed is critical.
The industries involved in the development of safety related systems, such as
railway, aerospace, automotive, moved closer to graphical tools such as AS-
CET, AutoFocus [38], SCADE [19], and Simulink/Stateflow [82]. In particu-
lar, Simulink/Stateflow is widely used for the development of embedded control
applications, thanks to the built-in tools Stateflow Coder [81] and Real Time
Workshop Embdedded Coder [80] which allow the generation of code starting
from models.
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General Electric Transportation Systems (GETS) is a well known railway sig-
nalling systems manufacturer leading in railway signalling systems, from Auto-
matic Train Protection systems (ATP) to Interlocking Systems (IXL). In early
2000's GETS decided to introduce formal methods in its development process,
initially by the means of Simulink/Stateflow for modeling requirements, then for
code generation starting from the model, and finally applied to higher levels of
design, such as requirement and architecture specification.
GETS products are developed mostly for Europe and shall hence comply with
the CENELEC standards [9] [10], a set of norms and methods to be used while
implementing a product having a determined safety-critical nature. In order to
certify a product according to CENELEC, companies are required to give evi-
dence to the certification authorities that a development process coherent with
the prescriptions of the norm has been followed. The introduction of formal
methods in the development process is thus not easy: for example, in the case
of automatically generated code from formal descriptions, the code shall anyway
conform to specific quality standards, and normally the companies use coding
guidelines in order to avoid usage of improper constructs that might be harmful
from the safety point of view. Thus, when the Model-Based Development with
code generation is adopted, the generated code shall comply to the same stan-
dards asked for the hand-crafted code. Furthermore, the problem is raised also
for the used tools used code generation tools, since the norms ask for a certi-
fied or proven-in-use translator from models to code: Simulink/Stateflow do not
possess this property, and thus a strategy has to be defined in order to address
this issue.
Once the Model-Driven Development was accepted formally in the development
process of the company, the research activity moved its focus into the intro-
duction of modeling techniques and formal methods also in early phases of the
development process, such as requirements and architecture specification, in or-
der to create an uniform development process.
The need for a more formal approach to high-level design derives, among the
others, from the inadequacy of a text centric approach, which usage has been
reduced in favor of a more formal notation, traceability enforcement and cross-
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phase integrated documentation obtained through the usage of SysML/UML
graphical languages (Object Management Group [OMG], [53]).
The dissertation, which reports the results achieved in the context of the col-
laboration between GETS and University of Florence, is structured as follows.
Chapter 1 presents an overview of the normative background in which GETS
operates, an introduction to the definition of formal methods and the objectives
of the research and collaboration with GETS. In Chapter 2 is given a short in-
troduction to the Model-Based Design and to the Simulink/Stateflow toolsuit.
In Chapter 3 it is presented the Model-Based Design approach applied to the
GETS development process of software products, result of the research and the
collaboration with University of Florence, and a case study in the context of the
SSC Baseline 3 GETS developed project, is detailed in order to better understand
the technologies applied to the new development process. In Chapter 4 it is pre-
sented the second direction of the research, the introduction of formal methods
in the early phased of the development, i.e., the requirements and architecture
specification through the usage of SysML language. Chapter 5 summarizes the
leasson learned during research and the experience in collaboration with GETS.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Formal methods
With the term formal methods we refers to mathematically rigorous techniques
and tools for the specification, design and verification of software and hardware
systems [15] [5] [49]. Mathematically rigorous means that:
• specifications used in formal methods are well-formed statements in a
mathematical logic;
• the verifications are rigorous deductions in that logic;
The formal methods applied to development process usually result in a frame-
work that includes a formal language, verification techiniques and a set of tools
that implements all the above. The formal language is an unambiguous nota-
tion which possess well-defined semantics and syntax, used to express a system
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specification. The verification techniques are applied basing on the system speci-
fication in order to check if the system conforms to the desired properties. Finally,
the tools are intended as a development process which is composed by successive
refinements in which the intial specification is transformed into a more detailed
representation of the system until the final implementation, included the verifi-
cation of the system properties.
Formal methods have been widely discussed in literature, such as the VDM
(Vienna Development Method) [41], B method [69], and the RAISE (Rigorous
Approach to Industrial Software Engineering) [51] method, together with for-
mal methods that focus mostly on parts of the whole formal process, such as
PVS (Prototype Verification System) [58], HOL (Higher Order Logic) [32] and
Z [73]. Unfortunately these methods did not widely spread in industrial employ-
ment, since, except for few projects such as Paris Metro onboard equipment [23],
where the B method has been employed, and the Maeslant Kering storm surge
barrier control system [86], where both the Z and the Promela [37] notations
have been used, there is scarce in industrial context. Industries perceive formal
methods as experimental techologies, and scepticism about their usefulness re-
mains widespread.
1.1.2 Norms in the design and development of safety-
critical railway systems
The Safety Critical systems are those systems whose exercise involves a level of
risk of exposure of people, environment and material assets to dangerous situ-
ations, with the possibility of accidents due to malfunctions caused by errors or
failures [9] [11] [10]. It is necessary to be sure that a system has a probability
less than a given tolerable limit (THR, Tolerable Hazard Rate) to cause serious
injury, before it can be put into operation. Safety is therefore defined as the
absence of unacceptable levels of risk [9], or even the property of a system to
not cause harm to human life or to the environment [70].
In the field of railway signalling, standards were created by CENELEC (Comité
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européen de normalization en électronique et en électrotechnique or European
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization), and, since 2002, these stan-
dards have been also prescribed by RFI (Italian Railway Network) as a reference
for the certification of products and electronic systems in safety in railway sig-
nalling. Some of these standards are listed below:
• EN-50126 [9]: Railway applications - The specification and demon-
stration of dependability, reliability, availability, maintainability and safety
(RAMS).
• EN-50129 [11]: Railway applications - Safety related electronic systems.
• EN-50128 [10]: Railway applications - Software for railway control and
protection systems.
• EN-50159 [12]: Railway applications - Communication, signalling and
processing systems - Part 1: Safety related communication in closed trans-
mission systems.
Figure 1.1: CENELEC norms scopes of application
The basic concept of the EN-50128 norm is the SSIL (Software Safety In-
tegrity Level): the higher is the level of a system, the more serious are the
consequences of a failure. Integrity levels range from 0 to 4, where 0 is the lower
level, which refers to software with no effects on the safety of a system, and 4 is
the maximum. These standards are in relation to each other as shown in Figure
1.1. The horizontal axis of the figure shows the scope of each standard, as is
shown on the vertical progression from the most general to the most specific
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standard.
The intention of CENELEC is to provide a model at European level in which
the development of the safety-critical systems and their verification are oriented
to totality of the dependability requirements. Dependability is defined as the
property of a system to be usable by an human being, or a community, with-
out the danger of unacceptable risks [3]. Dependability includes the following
attributes:
• Reliability: is the capacity of a system to perform a required function,
under certain conditions and for a specified period of time.
• Availability: is the ability of a system to perform a required function
at a certain time or during a specified time interval, given the necessary
resources.
• Maintainability: probability that for a given system unit can be carried
out a given active maintenance action, during an interval of time, imple-
mented through procedures and required means.
• Safety: absence of intolerable levels of risk of harm.
The development process of a system subject to the requirements RAMS
(Reliability - Availability - Maintainability - Safety) is therefore composed of the
following stages [59] :
• definition of the scope and objective of the system;
• analysis of the risk (e.g., calculation of the tolerable failure rate);
• design of the system functions. The requirements of each safety function
defines the integrity level of the system;
• implementation;
• installation of the system;
• submission of the safety analysis produced during the development stages
to the railway authority.
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The safety requirements are central for this model of development: they guide
the design and implementation of the system and are used as a reference when
evaluating the model itself. The risk analysis provides the tools necessary to
establish safety requirements; the process of risk analysis includes [59]:
• Hazard analysis: the hazard is defined as a risky situation that can lead
to an accident. At this stage of the risk assessment it is necessary to
identify the potential hazard, and reconstructs the sequence of events that
can lead to them, in order to calculate the probability that these events
will occur. This probability is classified by levels, ranging from Incredible
(when it is assumed that a hazard can never occur) to Frequent.
• Risk assessment: in this phase are defined sequences of events leading
from an hazard to an accident, which is classified according to severity,
as well as the hazards. The severity varies from the maximum level of
Catastrophic, where people are killed and wounded, to Insignificant, if only
minor injuries and little damage to the system happen.
Once the two assessments above have been evaluated, it is determined what
is the acceptable risk for each hazard, in accordance with the recommendations
by railway authority.
Among the norms that are part of the CENELEC, EN 50128 is the one that
specifies the procedures and technical requirements for the development of pro-
grammable electronic systems for the usage in railway control and protection
applications. This norm applies only within the scope of the software (e.g.,
firmware, operating systems, applications) and the interaction between the soft-
ware and the system.
The development of secure software also requires the application of some basic
principles , including:
• modularity;
• verification activities at each stage of the development cycle;
• libraries and modules that are used must be verified;
• creation of clear documentation;
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The system verification is an essential step: it is driven by the requirements,
and aims to demonstrate that the system meets the safety and integrity require-
ments. Quantitative verification can not be carried out within the software, since
the rate of failure and the contribution it gives to the occurrence of an accident
cannot be quantified. For this reason the software is verified using qualitative
techniques: the EN 50128 defines a life cycle for the definition of the specifica-
tions, the development and verification of software. At each stage of the cycle
there is a verification process to ensure the compliance of the system to the level
of integrity required. This life cycle is shown in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Phases of the life cycle of the software (CENELEC EN-50128)
The norm also lists tables in which in which the techniques that can (or must)
be applied to ensure conformity of the system are related to the required level of
integrity with the integrity level itself. An example of such a table is shown in
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Figure 1.3. As you can see there are different priorities in the recommendations:
• 'M', mandatory: indicates that the technique must be used for the given
level of integrity;
• 'HR', highly recommended: indicates that the technique should be
used for the given level of integrity. If this technique is not used, this shall
be justified and another equivalent technique shall be used in its place;
• 'R', recommended: is a technique that can be used at the discretion
of designers and verifiers;
• '-' : indicates that there are no recommendations in the use of the
technique nor the reasons why it should not be adopted;
• 'NR', (not recommended): indicates that the technique is not recom-
mended for the given level of integrity. However, if this technique is used,
it must be justified.
Figure 1.3: Example of relationship between techniques and levels of integrity
1.1.3 Quality of code according to standard CENELEC
EN 50128
The norm CENELEC EN 50128 provides, among other things, information about
the quality, the required structure, readability, traceability and testability of re-
quirements [24]. In the table shown in Figure 1.3 it is possible to note how to
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adopt standards in the coding is highly recommended for each type of system,
regardless of the SIL, if not mandatory: it is highly recommended to provide a
uniform layout of the code, as well as to strengthen the use of standard methods
of safe design.
The Coding Standards are a set of rules and restrictions on a given programming
language useful to avoid possible failures that can be caused by the use of that
specific programming language. Among the provided rules are:
• justification for the use of a specific programming language;
• standard already available for a given programming language;
• restrictions to use to avoid failures;
Also the norm DO-178B [61], which is the reference document for determining the
safety and reliability of software in avionics, defines the Software Code Standards
as concerning the code formatting and the conventions used for the names of
variables, functions, and so on, and this is further evidence that the code quality
is critical in environments in which software safety-critical related systems have
to be developed: in fact the adoption of a common and consistent coding style
facilitates the understanding and maintenance of the code, especially if it is
developed by multiple people in co-operation.
1.2 Problem statement
This dissertation is the result of a three years reasearch activity and collaboration
with GETS, started at the end of 2009, aiming at addressing the following:
Problem Statement
Defining and implementing a methodology for the adoption of
formal methods and code generation technology in the development
of safety-critical systems by a railway signalling manufacturer.
During the research, the problem statement has been decomposed into the
following sub-goals:
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1. Finalize the introduction of the Model-Based Design in the development
process with a special focus on the validation of the translation process
and the verification process. The generated code correctness is fundamen-
tal, CENELEC EN 50128 norm [10] asks for a certified or proven-in-use
translator. Since Simulink/Stateflow have not this property, a strategy has
to be defined in order to ensure that the code behavior is compliant to the
model behaviour, and no additional improper functions are added during
the code synthesis phase.
2. Integrate the new formal development techinque in the process, also in
the early phases of development, such as requirements specification and
architecture specification. The introduction of new technologies in an es-
tablished process is not straightforward: the process structure shall be
adjusted and shall be maintened coherent even if changes are applied. For
GETS, which operates in a safety-critical systems development context,
this is fundamental, since its products have to be validated according to
the prescripted normatives.
CHAPTER 2
Model Based Design and Code Generation
Model-Based Design (MBD) [71] has been widely accepted and adopted by in-
dustries. The basic concept of the MBD is that the whole software development
process aims to produce graphical model abstractions, from which to derive an
implementation, manually or automatically. There are tools which support the
possibility to simulate and test directly on the model (e.g., Simulink/Stateflow
[82], SCADE [19], Scilab/Scicos [68]) before the implementation is actually de-
rived. In its objective, i.e., to detect design defects before the project is deployed,
the MBD approach is not different from the formal methods, but the latter are
perceived more difficult to use than the former: MBD is closer to the needs of
developers, that consider the graphical approach more intuitive than a formal
description.
Simulink/Stateflow has been elected as de-facto standard for modeling and code
generation for safety industries, surpassing other tools such as SCADE, based on
Lustre synchronous language, Scilab/Scicos, an open source platform for mod-
elling and simulating control systems, ASCET [20] and AutoFocus [38], both us-
ing block notations for the representation of distributed processes and embedding
advanced verification capabilities. Simulink/Stateflow provides a lot of built-in
blocks and libraries, and its intuitive state machine graphical editor (Stateflow)
12
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allows the developers to build prototypes and simulate directly on them in a very
intuitive way.
In this chapter it is briefly introduced the Model-Based Design approach and it
is presented the Simulink/Stateflow toolsuite that has been chosen by the com-
pany in order to apply the MBD development paradigm to the development of
safety-critical railway signalling systems.
2.1 Basic concepts of Model-Based Design
The use of models for the development of complex systems is now an established
practice in many engineering disciplines, such as the construction of complex
buildings such as bridges, or, in the mechanical domain, cars. The models help
in understanding the problem, and thanks to a high level of abstraction also help
in finding the solution. It is obvious, therefore, that this approach to develop-
ment has recently been proposed for the creation of software, often considered
among the most complex engineering systems. The Model Based Design is based
on the paradigm that the main objective, and the product, of the software de-
velopment are the models instead of code listings [71]. The biggest advantage
that is derived from this approach is the fact that the models are expressed using
concepts, which are less restrictive than the technologies that must be employed
for implementation, and are closer to the problem domain that is being analyzed.
This translates into ease of specification, understanding and maintenance of the
designed system. Another important advantage is the independence of the cho-
sen programming language: the models in fact possess a sufficiently high level
of abstraction to be able to decouple from the implementation choices.
To exploit the full potential of MBD is necessary to:
• generate the software completely from the model. This approach is rel-
atively recent, as earlier models were only used to generate the software
structure (skeleton) or code fragments. The automatic code generation
assumes with respect to the programming languages the same role that
the third generation of languages has taken with respect to the assembly
language.
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• automatically verify the models (e.g., by executing the model it is simulated
the behavior of the system).
Therefore, the models are used for both the generation of the code and, in a
certain way, for the verification of the same. Figure 2.1 schematically shows the
difference between an approach that uses the model as a basis for development-
level documentation (left) and MBD approach with complete generation of code
(right) [46].
Figure 2.1: The MBD approach with code generation
In order for the MBD approach to be useful and effective, the models con-
structed must have five key features [71]:
Abstraction is the most important feature. A model is a reduced-scale transla-
tion of the system that is meant to represent. If you go to hide, or eliminate,
the details that are irrelevant to a given point of view, the model allows to
understand more easily the essence of the system more easily. Given that
the required systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated, abstraction
is the only method that allows to deal with the increasing complexity.
Understandability: compared to the directives used in the code listings, which
require an understanding of often extremely intricate syntactic rules, the
model allows to have a a rather clear overview of the system. Abstraction
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is not enough, but it is necessary to take into account, during the process
of modeling, this desirable property that the model should have.
Accuracy: a model should provide a representation consistent with the capabil-
ities of the system that it purports to represent.
Predictability: it shall be possible, through the use of a model, to predict
the properties of interest of the system, both through the execution of
the model (i.e., the simulation of the system) than through some kind of
formal analysis.
Convenience: the last property that the model must have is that of being
economic: this means that it must be cheaper to build and analyze the
model rather than the modeled system.
Given the characteristics listed, it is essential to take into account the quality of
the models that are being created.
2.2 The importance of the quality of the mod-
els
To ensure that the MBD approach is also applicable in the development of rail-
way protection systems, it is essential that the code generators used provide a
translation from model to code of a certain quality, that complies with the reg-
ulations in force in this field.
Given what has been said about it, it is easy to see how the models are closely
related to the system they represent, and as a result the quality of the models is
crucial to the quality of the produced software. This has given rise to the need
to transfer to the models a series of checks that were previously performed on
the code listings: in fact, the MBD approach allows the application of various
types of analysis directly the model (e.g., the static analysis and simulation), re-
ducing the number of checks carried on directly on the code, which are the most
expensive ones. Many companies in various sectors, such as rail, automotive and
aerospace industries, which have adopted the MBD approach, have created rules
and verification techniques that, when applied to models, allow to understand
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if the code that will be generated automatically from those models will meet
expected directives, which are defined to improve quality, increase safety and
efficiency.
2.3 Brief introduction to Simulink / Stateflow
modeling tools
In this section it will be briefly introduced the Simulink/Stateflow [82] modeling
suite, which increased its popularity in the last years also thanks to its usage in
the Model-Based Design by major companies working in safety-critical contexts
(e.g., Airbus [78], Alstom [79], NASA [84]).
This introduction will give an overview on principal components of Stateflow
tool, starting from the FSM, modeled through Stateflow Graphic Editor, to the
Automatic Code Generation functionalities given by the Stateflow Coder.
2.3.1 Introduction
Stateflow is a tool for modeling by means of Harel state machines [36]. The
tool is fully integrated in Simulink and interacts with it in the creation of models
with a high level of detail: however Simulink is suitable for the modeling of dy-
namic systems, dealing with the dynamics for continuous-time and discrete-time
systems, while Stateflow provides a suitable environment for the development of
models aimed at the realization of logical algorithms and event-driven reactive
systems.
Domain
Stateflow is today widely used in many industries, among which stand the auto-
motive one and aerospace one. The joint use of Simulink and Stateflow allows
the creation of embedded control systems. Simulink is used for the implemen-
tation of numerical algorithms, while Stateflow is better suited to the creation
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of the control logic of reactive systems, i.e., systems that change their state in
response to an event. The reactive systems are thus modeled as state machines
[24] [44].
Stateflow is extremely useful for the design of:
• Functioning logic: control of the system behavior according to its func-
tioning mode. The system under development can thus assume a limited
number of functioning states.
• Supervisory logic: flow-chart design. It determines how the system be-
haves in reaction to events or conditions.
• Scheduling: scheduling and timing of activities.
• Errors management: supervision over the process of identification, iso-
lation and resolution of error conditions in the system.
Stateflow basic concepts
Stateflow is based on the theory of state machines enunciated by David Harel
in the late '80s [36], and adopted by the UML standard. Harel introduced an
enhanced version of the state machines, retaining the graphical formalism but
introducing innovative elements that allow extremely flexible modeling and a high
level of detail, impossible to achieve with traditional state machines.
The innovations concern:
• deterministic automata;
• hierarchical approach (states can have different priorities during execution);
• parallelism (more than one state active at the same time);
• new semantics;
In this context, a finite state machine is defined as the representation of a
reactive system, driven by events. In such a system, the transition from one
operative mode, or state, to another is accomplished when certain conditions
occur.
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Generally, the finite state machines are represented by their graphs of compo-
nents, states, and the connections between them, the transitions: the behavior
of the whole designed system is provided in terms of transitions between states;
the active state at a given time is determined precisely by the path that goes
from the initial state and moves along transitions triggered by conditions.
2.3.2 Stateflow
Stateflow allows to build finite state machines that can be used to simulate the
behavior of a system, or to generate code that will be used for embedded systems
(e.g., control systems). Below are presented the main components available in
Stateflow to create such machines.
Stateflow elements
States
The state is one of the fundamental components of Stateflow, and describes a
mode of operation of an event-driven system. The fact that a state is active or
not changes dynamically based on events that have occurred and the conditions
that have been met during the execution of the FSM.
Every state has a parent state, even if the Stateflow diagram is composed of a
single state: in this case the parent is the state diagram itself, which contains
the state. It is possible to insert states in other states, so as to form a hierarchy.
Each state has a name that uniquely identifies it among those of the same
hierarchical level. In addition, in the label of a state, other than the name, can
be specified a number of actions that must be performed at particular times of
execution:
• entry (en): the action that follows this keyword is performed by the
system every time that the state is activated, i.e., an event brings the FSM
into that specific mode of operation;
• during (du): the action that follows this keyword is performed until the
system has this specific mode of operation. Once the system exits from the
mode of operation related to this state, the action is no more performed;
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• exit (ex): the action that follows this keyword is performed when the
system changes mode of operation, i.e., exits from the state;
• on event : the action that follows this keyword is performed when the
specified event occurs.
An example of a state with specified actions is represented in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Actions specified in the label of a state
Stateflow provides two types of states that can be used for the realization of
the finite state machine which models the system:
• Parallel states (AND), shown in Fig. 2.3, that can be simultaneously
active at a given instant of execution. The picture shows that both states
are highlighted in blue, that indicates that a state is active at a given
moment of time.
Figure 2.3: Parallel states execution
• Exclusive states (OR), shown in figure 2.4, which can not be active
simultaneously. Also in this case the pciture shows how only a state during
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the execution of the two is active, as only one of them is highlighted in
blue.
Figure 2.4: Exclusive states execution
Transitions
A transition is a graphical object that, in most cases, connects an object to
another: the transition is characterized by a source object and a target object,
that not necessarily are states. The label on a transition describes the condition
that enables passing from the source to the destination object.
A transition can thus connects:
• two states;
• a state and a junction;
• two junctions;
• a state and a box object;
• a junction and a box object;
It is important to note that the transitions have a direction. An unlabeled tran-
sition that connects two states is shown in Fig. 2.5.
Conditions
The conditions are Boolean expressions that specify, with their value, if a tran-
sition should be triggered or not, given that the source state of the transition is
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Figure 2.5: A transition between two states
active at the time when the condition becomes true. Wanting to make a practical
example, we may consider the change of gear of an engine, which occurs when
the speed exceeds a certain threshold. This can be represented with the chart
shown in Fig. 2.6. The condition is indicated on the label of the transition and
enclosed in brackets. The figure also shows the hierarchy that may exist between
the states: the state Gear contains the two states First and Second, making the
state Gear the parent of the other two states.
Gear_shift is instead another type of Stateflow construct, i.e. an Event: this
further type of objects that Stateflow provides to modelers will be described be-
low, in a dedicated section.
Actions
The actions, when specified in the label of a transition, can belongs to two
classes:
• actions related to the condition, which are executed when the correspond-
ing condition is true at the moment of the transition;
• actions related to the transition, which are executed when the transition is
enabled, without dependence on conditions.
Both types of actions are represented in Fig. 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: Example of a condition for the activation of a transition
Default transition
The default transition is a transition that specifies which particular state must
be active when there is ambiguity between two or more exclusive states at the
same hierarchical level. Fig. 2.8 shows an example of the usage of the default
transition: when the machine is turned on and reaches the state Lights, the
operation mode is placed on the state Off, which is connected to the default
transition, as long as the event Switch_on occurs. From the figure it can be
noticed that the default transition does not have a source object, but only a
target object.
Data
The data are non-graphical objects that store numeric values used in Stateflow
charts; not having a corresponding graphic object, data are not directly rep-
resented on the chart, but can be accessed through the user interface Model
Explorer, shown in Figure 2.9. Each data has its own scope, which defines
whether the data is:
• local to the Stateflow diagram;
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Figure 2.7: Actions related to a transition
Figure 2.8: An example of using the default transition
• an output that goes from the Stateflow diagram to Simulink diagram of
which the first is as a component;
• an input from the Simulink diagram;
• data defined in the MATLAB workspace;
• constants;
From the image it is possible to note that Model Explorer provides numerous
information regarding the data, among which, as already mentioned, the scope,
the data type and the name of the data.
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Figure 2.9: Displaying Data in a Stateflow diagram using Model Explorer
The data can also be aggregated into unique objects, which are called Bus, which
can be compared, for example, to the structures in the C programming language.
Events
The events are non-graphical objects, similarly to data. Events guide the exe-
cution of the Stateflow diagram, and have a function similar to the switches.
Events can be managed through the Model Explorer; events can also be created
at any level of the hierarchy, and possess properties such as scope, which defines
whether an event is:
• local to the Stateflow diagram;
• an output that goes from the Stateflow diagram to Simulink diagram of
which the first is as a component;
• an input from the Simulink diagram;
The events can also be found on the labels of transitions: in a similar way as
applies to the conditions, the transition becomes active when the event that is
specified on the label occurs.
Junctions
The junctions are decision points in the system. A junction is a graphical object
that simplifies Stateflow diagrams representations, implementing constructs such
as if-then-else, shown in Fig. 2.10. The image also shows the code corresponding
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to the structure.
The junctions are crucial for the creation of Flowchart (functions), which will be
presented in the following paragraphs.
The transitions that are connected to the junction are called segments, and have
the same properties as any other transition.
Figure 2.10: If-then-else implemented through junction
Graphical functions
The graphical functions (or flowchart) are functions defined graphically by a
flow chart, and add expressive power to the language of the actions defined in
Stateflow. The functions are formed by transitions and junctions interconnected,
as shown in the example in Fig. 2.11. A function can have arguments and can
provide return values: in the case depicted by Fig. 2.11, the input arguments are
a and b, and the return value z is given by the sum of the squares of the two
arguments.
2.3.3 Graphic Stateflow Editor: an example
Simulink/Stateflow toolsuite can be used, as already introduced, for modeling a
system that requires a certain logic of operation. In this section it is presented
an example of the modeling through Stateflow of a controller for a system with
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Figure 2.11: Example of use of a function
two fans for cooling.
In Fig. 2.12 is shown the diagram representing the system, which decides, on the
basis of the detected temperature and provided input, if none, one or two fans
shall be activated. The Stateflow chart is integrated into a Simulink model, not
shown, which implements additional components forming a larger system.
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Figure 2.12: Example of Stateflow chart that implements a controller
The diagram is rather simple: it includes many of the components seen
in the previous paragraphs; the system is composed, at the top level of the
hierarchy, by two exclusive (OR) states; once started, the system goes in the
state corresponding to the operating mode in which the system is off (PowerOff ),
which is achieved by the default transition. If the event SWITCH occurs, the
system goes in the opposite state with respect to the current one (therefore will
turn on if it was off, and vice-versa). The state PowerOn is composed of three
substates, and all of them execute in parallel (AND). The states are:
• SpeedValue, which takes care of calculating at each instant (thanks to
the keywords du in the state label) the air flow output from the diagram
(airflow);
• FAN1, which implements the control logic of the first fan: when the tem-
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perature exceeds 120 degrees, the fan turns on, otherwise it is turned off;
• FAN2, which implements the control logic of the second fan: in this case,
the threshold temperature is 150 degrees.
Stateflow Coder: code generation starting from a model
As already introduced, Stateflow provides the ability to generate code from mod-
els, thanks to the instrument Stateflow Coder [81]. Stateflow Coder is able to
generate code from all objects and semantics Stateflow, allowing to realize stand-
alone applications or code that will be inserted into existing applications.
Once you have created a state machine using Stateflow, you can generate code
using the Model Explorer, a user interface that provides a variety of information
on a Simulink model and its components, including the Stateflow chart. The
language in which code is generated is the ANSI-C [2] standard issued in 1990
by the American National Standards Institute, and extremely used, along with
Ada [40], in many industrial fields that require safety standards.
To complete the overview is shown in Fig. 2.13, a code listing generated from a
simple Stateflow diagram, also shown in the same figure.
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Figure 2.13: Code generated by a diagram consisting of multiple states, both parallel
and exclusive
CHAPTER 3
MBD in the GETS Safety Critical Systems Development
General Electric Transportation Systems develops embedded platforms for railway
signalling systems and, inside a long-term effort for introducing formal methods
to enforce product safety, employed modelling first for the development of pro-
totypes [6] and afterwards for requirements formalization and automatic code
generation [24]. Within the new development context also the verification and
validation activities have experienced an evolution toward a more formal ap-
proach. In particular, the code-based unit testing process guided by structural
coverage objectives, which was previously used by the company to detect errors
in the software before integration, has been completely restructured to address
the new model-based paradigm. The process refactoring has been driven by three
main reasons:
• the traditional approach based on exercising the code behaviour resulted
in being too costly to be applied to a code that saw a size increment of
four times for the same project within two years. This fast growth was
partly due to the increase of the actual projects size and partly to the code
generators that, as known, produce more redundant code than the one
that could be produced by manual editing;
• when an automatic tool is used to translate from a model to software, it
30
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has to be ensured that the latter is actually compliant with the intended
behaviour expressed by the model;
• unit testing alone, whether model-based or code-based, cannot cover all
the possible behaviours of the code in terms of control flow and data flow.
Most notably, it lacks in detecting all those runtime errors, such as division
by zero and buffer overflow, that might occur only with particular data
sets.
The restructured unit level verification process is based on two phases, namely
model-based testing and static analysis by means of abstract interpretation. The
first phase is used to exercise the functional behaviour of models and code,
and, at the same time, to ensure that the synthesized code conforms to the
model behaviour. The second phase is used to ensure that the code is free from
runtime errors. Unit level verification costs were in the end reduced of about
70%, while decreasing the man/hours required for bug detection and correction.
During the research, particular focus has been given to the strategies followed to
address formal weaknesses and certification issues of the adopted tool-suite. In
previous projects, experimentation with the code generator led to the definition
of an internal set of modeling rules in the form of an extension of the MAAB
guidelines [44], a stable and widely accepted standard developed by automotive
companies. The guidelines concept is presented in 3.1.1. Concerning verification
of models and generated code, an enhancement of the two-phase approach has
been adopted: control-flow and functional properties have been verified through
model-based testing, presented in 3.2, while static analysis by means of abstract
interpretation (this issue has been studied wthin another PhD research activity
[34]) has been used to check data-flow properties. The model-based testing
activity has been performed through a code validation framework that executes
the same test cases both at model level and at code level. The framework
automatically verifies consistency of the test results for each model unit. This
idea basically settles the problem of having a qualified code generator, since
certification of conformity can be ensured each time the code is synthesized from
a model.
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3.1 MBD in the development process
The MBD process adopted represents an application of model-based practices to
a V based life-cycle, and it is the result of the collaboration between GETS and
University of Florence [28]. Four phases are considered as the core of the sys-
tem development: architecture, design, module verification and system integra-
tion/verification. Also formal verification has been introduced as experimental
verification activity, although not yet consolidated into the currently practiced
development process. Architecture and design activities concerning the project
have been reported in [25], while the verification steps represent an enhancement
of the approach presented in [8].
As stated before, the tool that GETS uses for the creation of the models is
Stateflow, by The MathWorks. The choice of using this tool rather than others
was dictated by a number of considerations accrued as a result of numerous as-
sessments of the potential environmental Stateflow, many of them carried out in
collaboration with the University of Florence [6].
Figure 3.1: Process Overview
Fig. 3.1 summarizes the overall process structure. Starting from system re-
quirements and using domain knowledge, a functional architecture in the form
of a UML component diagram is defined consisting of independent functional
units. According to this decomposition, system requirements are partitioned into
disjoint sets of unit requirements to be apportioned to the functions. The UML
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architecture is then translated into a Simulink architecture and the unit require-
ments are formalized in terms of Stateflow finite-state automata.
Stateflow models are designed using a safe subset of the language in order to en-
sure proper code synthesis [28]. Already in previous projects an extension of the
MAAB guidelines was used, aimed at enhancing the readability, maintainability
and structuring of the code. Additional restrictions have been introduced to fur-
ther constrain the Stateflow semantics to an unambiguous set of constructs (see
3.1.1). Concerning code generation, the company adopted the more customiz-
able RTW Embedded Coder in place of the previously used Stateflow Coder: the
transition was basically painless, since all the modeling rules developed for the
previous tool resulted in being applicable also for the new one.
Unit tests have been defined in the form of scenarios at the Stateflow model
level (3.2). To this end, an internally developed framework has been used that
automatically executes the test suite on the Stateflow automaton and on the
generated code to ensure functional coherence between model and software be-
havior. The confidence on the correctness of the generated code is increased
with the Polyspace tool for abstract interpretation [34], which completes the
unit-level verification activities. Finally, system tests are performed on an ad-hoc
train simulator with hardware in the loop.
During the research, formal verification (3.2.2) has been experimented at module-
level using Simulink Design Verifier (DV), a property proving engine that uses
Simulink/Stateflow both as modeling and as property representation language.
Unit requirements have been translated into Simulink formulae against which
Stateflow models have been verified.
3.1.1 Modeling guidelines
The quest for ever higher quality models, geared to increase the quality of the
generated code as required by the specification as CENELEC EN 50128, has
led GETS to the creation of corporate guidelines, called Istruzioni di Ente, which
must be applied in modeling stage by the designers, in order to achieve the above
mentioned qualities.
As stated before, the use of modeling guidelines can bring many improvements
both in the model and in the generated code starting from the model itself. It
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is also important to adopt a standard that describes the modeling rules, so that
they can be understood by everyone involved in creating diagrams and anyone
concerned to verify them. One of the available templates for the statement
and the description of the guidelines is created by the MathWorks Automotive
Advisory Board (MAAB, [44]) for Simulink and Stateflow models and used in
the document Control Algorithm Modeling Guidelines Using MATLAB, Simulink
and Stateflow [44]; the template, adopted also for the Istruzioni di Ente GETS
and shown in Figure 3.2, is thus formed:
Figure 3.2: Template for the statement and the description of guidelines
• ID: the ID of a rule must be composed of two lowercase letters and four
numbers separated by an underscore symbol (i.e.,_). An ID is unique,
and once assigned to a guideline should not be changed anymore.
• Title: the title should provide a brief description of the rule, and which
aspects of the model it covers.
• Priority: priority has a dual function, that indicates the importance of the
rule and determine the consequences of violations. Must be selected from
the following:
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 Mandatory: are the rules considered essential, and those for which
the company guarantees full compliance of its models. If violated,
the model may not work according to specification. If the guideline
is ignored, both in design and in testing phase, the reason must be
documented.
 Strongly recommended: a rule that has this priority must be respected
as long as there are corporate policies that prevent or limit its appli-
cability. It is not necessary that the models conform to these rules
100%, therefore a violation of the same translates, for example, in
a deterioration of the model or problems regarding reusability and
maintainability, but does not affect the operation of the system.
 Recommended: the guidelines that this priority is used to improve
the look and feel of the model, but they are absolutely critical with
respect to the operation or other important aspects.
• Visibility: it represents the scope of the rule, i.e., if the rule has been
integrated from external rules (e.g., MAAB [21]) or it has been developed
internally to the company.
• MATLAB version: represents the version for which the rule applies. If
a guideline contains the special features that limit its application in all
versions of the software, this should be specified in this field.
• Prerequisites: this field points to those rules that are a prerequisite for
the rule in question, in the sense that in order to satisfy the rule in question,
the model should first satisfy the prerequisite ones.
• Description: Here is a description of the rule in natural language. If
necessary, images and tables can be added.
• Objective: the goal is the reason why the guideline was designed:
 Readability: it concerns the documentation, the appearance of the
model (and hence the visual comprehension), the design of usable
interfaces;
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 Workflow: it concerns the ease of development, maintainability, reuse
of model, and portability;
 Simulation: a rule that has this target is proposed to increase the
execution speed of the simulation of the system, and to decrease the
required memory;
 Verification and validation: conformity with a rule that has this goal
improves the traceability of requirements and testing;
 Code Generation: it concerns the quality and the robustness of the
generated code.
• Last change: in this field is specified in which version of the document
has been made the last change to the guideline.
3.2 Generated code verification and MBT
Traditionally GETS has used, as the main approach to verification of code units,
white-box testing based on path coverage. This approach has revealed to be
almost unfeasible due to the high structural complexity of the automatically gen-
erated code. A two phase verification process [8] was defined to address this
shortcoming: the first phase implements model-based testing to verify the func-
tional requirements coverage, the second phase employs abstract interpretation
[18] to statically enforce runtime errors detection. The first phase has been later
improved to obtain an implicit validation of the code generator as well.
The adopted approach for MBT comprises two steps. The first one is a form
of model/code back-to-back (B2B) testing [76], where both the model and the
related generated code are tested using the same stimuli as inputs, and the nu-
merical results obtained as output are checked for equivalence. The second one
consists of an additional evaluation to grant the absence of unwanted and un-
expected behaviours introduced by the model-to-code translation process. This
evaluation is basically the comparison of the measures of structural coverage
reached on both the code and the model. The two phases could be seen respec-
tively as a duplicated black-box testing (output comparison) and a duplicated
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white box testing (coverage comparison).
The B2B testing step is depicted in Fig. 3.3 (a). First, a Stateflow model
is created starting from the unit requirements. This model represents the be-
havioural view of the system. In order to verify if this behaviour is compliant
with the specification, a test suite for the model is manually derived from the
specification, according to the full requirement coverage criterion (i.e., at least
one test for each functional requirement). The outputs given by the simulation
with the given test data are visually checked to assess those behaviours which
do not comply to the specifications.
A tool called Test Observer was developed and used to automatically translate
the functional unit tests written for the Stateflow model into an appropriate form
to be used as tests for the generated code. Test Observer records both input
and output sequences of the model during the simulation in the form of Simulink
time series, that are Simulink data objects composed by pairs (time, value), and
then translates the time-series into given input/expected outputs matrices for
the generated module. C code is then generated starting from the model, using
RTW Embedded Coder. For each test case another tool, called Test Integrator,
produces an executable file that embeds the given input/expected output ma-
trices, together with a set of functions to check if the output of the generated
code matches the expected output. If the code executes without errors, then it
can be stated that, for the given functional unit test, the generated code shows
the same behaviour of the model [33].
The B2B testing task has been improved during the research activity and inte-
grated in a new framework, called 2M-TVF (Matlab Model to Validation Frame-
work), whose workflow is depicted in Fig. 3.3 (b). The 2M-TVF framework offers
functionalities of validation of the code generation process and of the generated
code itself, and it is further detailed in the next paragraphs.
3.2.1 2M-TVF and the translation validation
As stated in the previous chapters, products traditionally developed by GETS,
like any railway signalling application developed for Europe, shall comply with the
CENELEC standards [10]. The CENELEC EN 50128 considers two alternative
strategies to assure the correctness of the tools that produce the code that is
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Figure 3.3: Approaches of the automation of MBT
finally embedded in the product, such as compilers or automatic code generators:
the first one requires the code generator to be validated, and the second one is
based on the so called proven in use property. However, both strategies could
not be applied for the adopted code generator: the validation of the generator is
unfeasible, since the source code is proprietary and no information is given about
its development process; also the translator could not be considered as a proven
in use tool. Furthermore, the creation of a specialized tool, and its validation, is
not in line with the company strategy, which completely resorts to the usage of
commercial tools.
The problem has been addressed for the first time in the context of the Metrô Rio
project1, using an approach that is inspired to the one presented in [17], called
Translation Validation2: this approach is not focused on the code generator
itself, but on the inputs and the outputs of code generation process and on their
comparison. The validation of the generated code is performed through two
phases:
1. Dynamic testing (running the model through simulation and generated
1Metrô Rio is a project started in 2008 that concerns an ATP (Automatic Train Protection)
platform for the metro of Rio de Janeiro
2Translation Validation refers to a process that involves the comparison between code and
models behavior as a model-based conformance testing. The term Translation Validation has
been previously used in literature to address a similar problem in [60]
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code and compiled) and subsequent comparison of the results obtained.
This phase is analogous to the B2B phase in its first form (see 3.2). The
tests shall be extensive, defined starting from the modeled requirements,
with a 100% requirements coverage. In the first phase of the validation
of the generated code, a functional/black box testing is performed, where
both model and code are stimulated with the same inputs, and their out-
puts are compared for equality. If there are differences between the model
outputs and the code outputs, they shall be assessed.
2. Additional assessments to ensure the absence of unexpected functions in-
troduced during the translation process model code (e.g., comparison of
the measurements of the model and code coverage). In order to perform
this evaluation, it is necessary to use comparable metrics for model and
code coverage [4]. In our case we chose to use decision coverage for the
model and branch coverage for the code3. Since a branch is the outcome
of a decision, branch coverage is defined as the ratio between the number
of decision outcomes that have been exercised by a test suite and the total
number of decisions in the code. The choice of those metrics is due to
the fact that the CENELEC EN 50128 requires at least statement cover-
age, that is automatically implied when full branch coverage is achieved;
furthermore, since no continuous dynamic Simulink blocks are used in our
modeling approach, the decision for those metrics is appropriate. As stated
in [17], if the code coverage obtained after test execution is less than the
model coverage, then some unwanted functionality might have been intro-
duced by the translator.
2M-TVF, which stands for Matlab Model Translation Validation Framework, is a
framework that has been developed to perform the model-based testing and the
code validation process. The framework works under the Simulink environment,
and in order to carry out the validation process, allows for the definition of a
validation model that includes both the Matlab model to be tested and the
related generated code, embedded in a Simulink block. The code is previously
3Decision coverage and branch coverage are synonymous. It was decided to maintain both
definitions since the former is used in code-testing context, while the latter is used in model-
testing contexts
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instrumented to permit the evaluation of the coverage after the tests execution,
and then it is compiled and linked to obtain the executable.
The validation of the translation process is divided into two phases:
The approach described above is shown schematically in Fig. 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Stages of the process validation of the code generation
To be able to perform the described evaluations is thus necessary to have
a well-structured model, which is corresponding to what is reported by the re-
quirements, and a series of tests to be run on the model. It is also necessary to
choose a metric of adequate coverage, both for the model and, in congruence,
for the code.
After performing the tests, any difference in the results, be it in the numerical
comparison of the outputs or in the coverage of the model and the code must
be justified by identifying any systematic behavior of the code generator or real
errors in the translation from model to code.
It is important to emphasize that the process of validation concerns the pro-
cess of generating code and the generated code, but not the generator itself: to
demonstrate the ability of the generator to correctly translate, it is necessary to
repeat the activity on many projects without replacing the generator (ref. EN
50128, B.65 [Ref 2]). The code generated for a single application, however, is
valid.
In order to perform the validation process of the translator is thus required to
have:
• The model (Stateflow Chart) on which to perform the tests. The chart
must be well-formed (i.e., designed according to the requirements and the
modeling guidelines).
• An interface model that refers to the original model. The interface model
shall be composed of a part of input processing, the reference block and a
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part of outputs processing, as represented in Fig. 3.5.
• A set of test vectors (defined as MATLAB arrays) that will be inputs for
the interface model and processed by the referred model. The tests should
be designed for:
 full coverage of the requirements;
 full coverage of the model: the metric for coverage (e.g., decisions,
conditions) will be evaluated separately for each project depending on
the complexity of the project itself.
The definition of the test suite is a manual activity: the tests are origi-
nated starting from the models and the unit requirements defined during
the design phase of the system development, according to the requirement
coverage criterion. Automatic functional test generation techniques were
not used due to the fact that they generally require models with a higher
level of abstraction than the ones we use to generate code. The time
needed to devise the tests, by a domain expert, is of the same order of
magnitude than the time needed to model the system.
Figure 3.5: Reference model for testing through 2M-TVF
The 2M-TVF aims to provide functionality to validate the process of code
generation and code itself. Once the interface model and Stateflow model that
represents the system have been provided, the Framework proceeds according to
the following steps:
1. Create a reference model from which to generate the code.
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2. Generate the code from the reference model.
3. Compile and instrumentat the code for the calculation of the coverage.
4. Create a validation model composed by interface model and generated and
compiled code.
5. Run tests on validation model and.
6. Generate a report containing the results of the tests on the model.
It is important to note that:
• The syntax errors are not subject to evaluation by the 2M-TVF Framework,
despite the dynamic behavior of the validation process can report them if
they are present. The syntax errors anyway shall be taken care of in an
earlier phase of the development.
• The model that represents the system is never changed during the whole
process, but always used by means of a reference model; the reference
model is a special Simulink/Stateflow model that incapsulates the original
model allowing to perform operations on the inputs and the outputs of the
original model without changing it.
The 2M-TVF execution steps are better detailed in the following.
Reference model creation: the reference model is created with the purpose
of generating code both from the reference model itself than from the
Stateflow Chart to which the reference model refers. The reference model is
a copy of the model used for the testing from which have been eliminated
the structures for the input pre-processing and ouptut post-processing.
Code generation from the reference model: the code is generated from the
reference model by means of RTW Embedded Coder [80]. The generator
configuration must be the same used every time it generates the code to
be compiled and installed on the target.
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Code instrumentation and compiling: the code is compiled and instrumented
in such a way as to obtain information on the coverage once it is executed.
The choice of the compiler and the linker has fallen on gcc v3.4.3 [31],
which holds the proven-in-use property and provides also built-in function-
alities for code coverage measurements.
Validation model creation: the validation model is created starting from the
reference model, which is copied and enriched with additional features,
such as a Simulink block that allows to integrate and run binary code into
the Simulink environment; to the binary code block are given the same
inputs that are passed to the reference model (and thus to the model it-
self). The outpus of the binary code block will be processed exactly as
the ones of the reference model.
The structure of the model validation is shown schematically in Fig. 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Structure of the validation model
Tests on validation model: the tests are defined as matrices in MATLAB and
designed to achieve the requirements coverage and full coverage of the
model according to the metric choice, are stored on the basis of MATLAB
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Workspace and from there sent to the model during the validation phase
of simulation. The data is then taken from the Workspace and passed in
input to the model of the system (via the reference) and code. In this way
both the high-level representation of the system and the generated code
are exercised.
At the end of the simulation results are stored in the Workspace and com-
pared. In case of discrepancies it will be necessary to justify the different
behavior between the model and run the code.
Report generation: after execution of the tests it will be automatically gen-
erated a report containing information about the validation model, the
simulation results and coverage .
Figure 3.7: 2M-TVF structure
The major advantage of the adoption of 2M-TVF is that the whole verification
process is conducted internally to the Simulink environment, and it is completely
automated.
3.2.2 Formal verification of model properties
The CENELEC EN 50128 norm states that formal verification techniques, such
as model checking [14] and theorem proving [13], are highly-recommended prac-
tices for safety-related software. Despite the norm guidelines and the successful
history of formal verification in academia, the adoption of these technologies
by companies is still more the exception than the rule. For example, in 2006,
Honeywell started defining an approach for the translation of Simulink models
into the input language of the SMV model checker [45], or the Rockwell Collins
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methodology [47], that starts from Simulink/State ow models to derive a repre-
sentation into the Lustre formal language, and then perform code generation (in
C and ADA) and formal verification through different engines such as NuSMV
and Prover.
Formal verification tools are still perceived as too much complex, requiring highly
specialized personnel that is able to deal with formal languages and temporal
logic. Furthermore, there is still no clear evidence on the actual benefits in terms
of cost reduction given by this technology with respect to traditional testing.
With the Metrô Rio project, GETS decided to perform a systematic experimen-
tation with formal verification by means of Simulink Design Verifier (DV), a test
generation and property proving engine based on Prover Technology [1], which
uses a proprietary algorithm based on Bounded Model Checking (BMC) with
SAT-solvers [16] combined with K-induction [72] techniques. It was not the first
time that the company practiced formal verification. In previous projects, the two
open source model checkers SPIN and NuSMV were evaluated for the verification
of railway interlocking equipments [25], and Statemate ModelChecker was used
in the development of a system for object detection in level crossing areas [6].
In this case the choice fell upon DV, since the tool uses Simulink/Stateflow as
modeling languages and it is fully integrated in the Matlab environment. These
aspects have been considered as favorable elements to disrupt the reluctance of
the developers towards formal verification.
Requirement
1 If an information point with authorized speed equals to zero is received, the system shall raise
the Train Trip (TT) event
2 If the TT event is raised, the TT procedure shall be activated
3 If the TT procedure is active, it shall remain active until the train is not standing
4 If the TT procedure is active, the brake shall be activated
5 If the TT procedure is active and ICO_TT is invisible, ICO_TT shall start blinking
Table 3.1: Extract of unit requirements for Metrô Rio project
The focus is again on units, and verification is performed at the level of the
Stateflow models. The main objective was to understand if, with the new formal
development process, the formal verification task could replace the costly unit
testing task.
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Verification through DV is performed by translating the property that one wishes
to verify into a formula expressed in the Simulink language. In the case of Metrô
Rio, the properties are the unit requirements we obtained through the system
functional requirements decomposition. The formula derived from the property
has the form of a graphical circuit where the variables considered by the property
are connected by Simulink blocks implementing logical (AND , OR, NOT , etc.),
arithmetic (+, −, ×, etc.) and time delay operators. The engine verifies that
the formula is globally true for every execution path of the Simulink/Stateflow
model. The property is interpreted as if both the A and G operators of the
popular CTL (Computation Tree Logic) paradigm would be prefixed to it: it is
basically an invariant. If the property is violated, a counterexample showing a
failing execution is given in the form of a test case for the model.
As an example of property representation, consider the fifth unit requirement of
Table 3.1, related to the Train Trip function4 of the system. This requirement can
be represented in the form of a Simulink circuit as depicted in Fig. 3.8. Following
Figure 3.8: Fifth requirement of Table 3.1 represented in the form of a Simulink circuit
the terminology of DV, the first part of the formula represents the assumption,
which is a set of hypotheses on the state of the model (i.e., the value assumed
by the input or output variables of the module). The second part of the formula
represents the proof, which is a set of expected values on the output that one
wants to hold whenever the hypotheses are met. The time delay operator of
the assumption is used to ensure that the proof is checked one execution step
after the verification of the assumption. The requirement has an equivalent
CTL representation: AG((in_train_trip_status = 1∧ out_ico_TT = 0)→
AX(out_ico_TT = 2)). Such an equivalent CTL representation is not easy to
4Train Trip is the normally the function concerning the control over the unauthorized passing
of a red signal
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give for more complex requirements, which can however be represented in the
Assumption/Proof form. Consider again the Train Trip function: once the train
comes to a standstill after the emergency brake issued by the system, the Train
Trip icon is supposed to stop blinking. Then, the driver pushes the icon for at
least one second, the icon disappears, and the system releases the brake so that
the train can leave again. We evaluate the following sub-requirement involved in
this function: If the Train Trip icon (ICO_TT) is visible and not blinking, the
train is standing and ICO_TT is pressed for at least one second, ICO_TT shall
become invisible. The corresponding Simulink circuit is represented in Fig. 3.9.
In this requirement a timer variable is involved: the button associated to the icon
shall remain pressed for at least one second before ICO_TT can change its state.
In the assumption part of the formula, two subsystems are used to evaluate the
duration of pressure. This is supposed to be more than 84 main cycles (each
main cycle has a minimum duration of 12ms, therefore 1000ms/12ms ≈ 84) to
enable the proof part of the formula. The CTL representation of this property
is in principle feasible, but requires the usage of 84 nested sub-formulae, each
using the next operator.
Figure 3.9: Unit requirement with timer in the form of a Simulink circuit
As one can infer from Table 3.1 and from the examples, all the unit requirements
used in this context have the form if < Φ >,< Ψ >. Φ is a condition sentence
that might involve entities related to input and output variables in the model,
while Ψ is an action sentence that involves entities related to output variables
only. The translation of these requirements into the Assumption/Proof form
is rather natural, and, in our requirements set, we have identified three classes
of requirements, according to the structure of the formula resulting from the
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translation:
• class 1 requirements where Φ involves input variables only. These can be
translated into a formula assumption(I)/proof(O), where I and O are
(possibly empty) subsets respectively of the input and output variable sets
of the Stateflow model to be verified. This class of requirements includes
requirements 1, 2 and 4 of Table 3.1. Invariants that are independent from
the input also belong to this class.
• class 2 requirements where Φ involves both input and output variables.
These can be translated into a formula assumption(I, Oi)/proof(Oj)
where Oi and Oj are (possibly disjoint) sub-sets of the output set. This
class includes requirements 3 and 5 of Table 3.1.
• class 3 requirements having any of the previous forms, but where the Φ or
Ψ require some value to hold for a certain amount of time. These can be
translated into a formula assumption(∗, Ti)/proof(∗, Tj), where Ti is a
set of timers on the variables of Φ, and Tj is a set of timers on the variables
of Ψ. The requirement associated to the circuit of Fig. 3.9 belongs to this
class.
Requirements that do not belong to any of the classes are not verifiable with DV.
Among these requirements we consider both non functional requirements, nor-
mally verified through model inspection also when model-based testing is applied,
and requirements that involve adherence of the output to complex mathematical
functions, such as the ones related to the computation of the braking curve (a
braking curve is used to calculate how long it will take a train to stop from a
given speed). In this case, the verification approach adopted has been model
duplication: a continuous model of the curve has been created, and its behavior
has been simulated and compared to the discrete model used for code generation.
We have translated and verified 80 out of the 377 verifiable unit requirements.
Our experiments have shown that requirements belonging to the first class need
10 minutes of set-up time on average, while for the second class we reach 15
minutes. The verification time is in both cases negligible (less than one minute).
The third class requires longer set-up time, around 40 minutes for each require-
ment, mostly due to the complexity of expressing relationships between events in
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the timeline through memory blocks or time delay operators. In many cases the
formal verification incurs state space explosion problems and fails to terminate,
hence these requirements are likely to need to be verified through testing.
Table 3.2 reports the number of requirements belonging to each class for the
Metrô Rio project. It can be noticed that most requirements belong to the first
two classes, which required limited set-up and verification time. Requirements
belonging to the third class are limited and are mainly related to human-machine
interaction (button pressure, icon display timers, etc.).
class 1 class 2 class 3 n.v.
# requirements 285 73 19 113
Table 3.2: Classification of requirements according to the associated formula
According to these results, a new verification process based on formal verification
can be foreseen. Requirements belonging to the first two classes can be formally
verified with a cost that is 50% to 66% lower than the one required for testing
(each test needs 30 minutes in average). Requirements of the third class and non
verifiable cases can be treated with the previously used approaches: model-based
testing or inspection. Unfortunately, except for the time elapsed in the verifica-
tion and the results of the tests, DV does not give any further information about
the process, and thus the user is unable to estimate which is the effective cost
of the verification, for example in terms of memory consumption.
The main threat to validity of our evaluation is given by the fact that the models
were already verified by means of testing: no further error was discovered during
the formal verification phase. Our estimates do not consider the iterative task of
adjusting models or formulae whenever a counterexample is issued. Nevertheless,
we believe that the cost of these adjustments can be compared to the cost of
fixing a bug detected by testing.
Introduction of formal verification in the established development process is still
at the evaluation stage. Despite the encouraging results in terms of costs, there
are other issues that have to be addressed, such as the qualification of the tools
and the integration of the approach with the other process tasks. The company
is currently defining solutions in these directions.
Chapter 3. MBD in the GETS Safety Critical Systems Development 50
3.3 MBD and safety-critical systems develop-
ment: a case study
In this section is detailed an example of development with MBD and formal veri-
fication performed during the experimentation in order to be evaluated by GETS,
starting from natural language requirements provided by RFI (Rete Ferroviaria
Italiana) in the context of SCMT project [62].
SCMT is the system of Automatic Train Protection (ATP), which was adopted by
the Italian railways over most of the territory, which lets you control the running
of the train basing on the aspect of the railway signals, to slow down and respect
speed limits imposed for given rail sections. The information submitted by the
Trackside sub-system (Sotto Sistema di Terra, SST) are received and processed
by the Board subsystem (Sotto Sistema di Bordo, SSB).
The function Presenza Personale di Macchina (PdM) [63] checks the behavior
of the drivers and starts emergency procedures if not-safe conditions occurs.
The function is modeled as a finite state machine according to the specifica-
tions of the system. Is then tested and verified in a formal way through the tool
Simulink/Stateflow to verify that the requirements expressed by the functional
specifications [62] [63] are indeed satisfied.
3.3.1 Model requirements and implementation
The system SCMT is composed by a Trackside sub-system (SST) and a Board
subsystem (SSB). The SST transmits to the SSB information about the current
speed of the train and current signal status. The SSB verifies that the train
travel in safety, otherwise it notifies to the driver any violation of a speed limit
or active automatically a the braking procedure. In the case of the function
Presenza PdM, the purpose is to verify that the driver is behaving correctly from
a safety point of view, checking its physical status through acoustic interfaces
(sound signals) and mechanical interfaces (buttons). The acoustic signals are
activated due to the loss of stationary condition (train is moving without permis-
sion) or in response to violations of speed limits. After the acoustic signal has
been activated, if there is no action on the mechanical interfaces within a given
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amount of time, the system requires the emergency braking.
RFI provided requirements to the GETS company in order to implement the de-
sired functionalities.
The implementation of the module Presenza PdM has been made using Simulink/S-
tateow starting from the given requirements. Each requirement can be part of
one of the following categories:
• [E], Essenziale: a prerequisite for the proper functioning of system.
• [D], Differito: essential requirement but delayed in time.
• [F], Facoltativo: no mandatory requirement.
• [U], Instabile: requirement that needs further study or more accurate de-
tails.
The requirements specified for the module Presenza PdM belong to the [E]
type, and then they are essential in the implementation.
The functional requirements regarding Module Presenza PdM are divided into
requirements capture inputs and requirements management.
Input requirements
The input requirements are summarized in the state diagram in Figure 3.10. The
requirements describe the interaction between the module Presenza PdM and
the other modules composing the SSB.
A subset of the requirements is listed below.
1. The function shall acquire periodically from the Odometry the train stop
condition (Treno fermo, TF ) in order to compute its functioning status.
2. The function shall acquire periodically from the Odometry the current train
speed (v) in order to evaluate the activation of the emergency braking.
3. The function shall acquire periodically from the Odometry the space (s) in
order to compute when to require the actions of the drivers (PdM).
4. The function shall acquire periodically from the Clock the current time
(RTC ) in order to compute when to require the actions of the drivers
(PdM).
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Figure 3.10: Function context diagram
5. The function shall acquire periodically from mechanical interfaces (Pul-
santi_X, Pedale_X with X = A o B according to which Cab is activated),
the intervention of mechanical interfaces by the driver in order to check
the driver's activity.
6. The function shall acquire from the Configuration Data the speed threshold
(S_vvig) for deciding the changing of control of driver actions from time-
based algorithms to speed-based algorithms (first hypotesis value for the
threshold is 100 Km/h).
7. The function shall acquire from the Configuration Data the time T_vig_min
to set, when the train has speed v > S_vvig, the driver's intervention
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minimum time threshold for button pressing (first hypotesis value for the
threshold is 2.5s).
8. The function shall acquire from the Configuration Data the time T_vig_max
to set, when the train has speed v > S_vvig, the driver's intervention
maximum time threshold for button releasing (first hypotesis value for the
threshold is 30s).
9. The function shall acquire from the Configuration Data the space S_vig_min
to set, when the train has speed v <= S_vvig, the driver's intervention
minimum space threshold for button pressing (first hypotesis value for the
threshold is 70m).
10. The function shall acquire from the Configuration Data the space S_vig_max
to set, when the train has speed v <= S_vvig, the driver's intervention
maximum space threshold for button releasing (first hypotesis value for the
threshold is 830m).
11. The function shall acquire periodically from the Emergency Procedure mod-
ule the information about the current status of emergency braking proce-
dure (active / not active) in order to be able to suspend driver's control
activities and re-initialize itself.
Starting from the requirements, the model in figure 3.11 has been designed.
In the model were included inputs, which are received by the module Presenza
PdM from other modules, and the outputs that the module provides to the other
ones. Concerning the configuration data, they represent fixed parameters and
therefore were modeled as constants, whose values are those of the first hypotesis
specified in the requirements.
It is important to notice that in the model were also added outputs not given
by the requirements in order to be able to verify properties through the Simulink
Design Verifier tool.
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Figure 3.11: Simulink model
Management requirements
The management requirements details how the model shall react basing on the
inputs and the internal state. In the case of SCMT the requirements were already
in the form of a Finite State Machine (FSM), represented in 3.12.
The Model-Based Design is particularly suitable in case of FSM-like require-
ments, since it is possible to have a one-to-one corrispondence between the
states defined by the requirements FSM and the designed model (depicted in
figure 3.13).
In order to better understand the development process, a list of requirements
and their implementation are listed below.
Req 1: The function shall behave as the FSM represented in Fig. 3.12.
Req 2: At the activation, the function shall be in state INIZIALIZAZZIONE.(Fig.
3.14)
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Figure 3.12: Requirements FSM
Req 3: Independently on the current state except for the state FRENATURA,
the function shall return in the state INIZIALIZZAZIONE if it is restored
the train stop (TF) condition or if it is currently happening an emergency
braking requested by another function(Fig. 3.15).
Req 4: In state INIZIALIZZAZIONE, the function shall disable all the currently
active timing checks and every acoustic notification (Fig. 3.16).
Req 5: From state INIZIALIZZAZIONE the function shall transit to state EMER-
GENZA (Fig. 3.17) if:
• No emergency braking has been requested by other functions.
• The train stop (TF) condition is lost.
Req 6: When the function transits into state EMERGENZA, it shall activate a
timer equal to T_vig_min and an acoustic notification.
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Figure 3.13: PdM Model chart
Figure 3.14: Activation of the SSB
It was decided to define three sub-states inside the state EMERGENZA:
Emergenza_init, Emergenza_p_premuto ed Emergenza_p_rilasciato. The
first one activates the acoustic notification (Suon_5=1) and starts com-
puting elapsed time and travelled space, while the other two states are
consequence of the Req. 8 and will be detailed later.
Req 7: The function shall transit from state EMERGENZA to state FRENATURA
if the timer T_vig_min elapses (Figure 3.19), activating the emergency
procedure Procedura di Emergemza, Proc_Emerg, deactivating the acousitc
notification Suon_5 and activating the recover emergency procedure (Pro-
cedura di Recupero Emergenza, Rec_Proc_Emerg) in order to permit the
re-enabling of the braking functionalities once the train has stopped (Fig-
ure 3.20). Once the T_vig_min elapsed (i.e., when T_ultima_pressione
>= T_vig_min), the system transits from state EMERGENZA to state
FRENATURA(Figure 3.19).
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Figure 3.15: Return to state INIZIALIZZAZIONE
Figure 3.16: State INIZIALIZZAZIONE
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Figure 3.17: From state INIZIALIZZAZIONE to state EMERGENZA
Req 8: the function shall transit from state EMERGENZA to state INTER-
FACCE AZIONATE and disable the acoustic notification if the mechanical
interfaces provided to the driver (e.g., button) are pressed and released
within T_funzione time (Figure 3.21).
In this requirement resides the explanation of the second and third sub-state
(Emergenza_p_pulsante ed Emergenza_p_rilasciato) inside the parent
state EMERGENZA: in fact once a button is pressed when the system is
in the parent state, the second sub-state activates and the check for the
pressure time starts. When the button is released, if the pressure time is
within T_funzione, the system transits into the third sub-state which will
make the system evolve into the state INTERFACCE AZIONATE.
3.3.2 Model verification
Once the Simulink model and the contained charts have been designed, the
properties that the system has to hold can be verified through the integrated
tool Simulink Design Verifier [83]. The tools represents an extension of the
Simulink tool and permits to verify and validate formally the properties on a
model.
The properties to verify are detailed through two blocks in the model:
• Assumption: it is placed on the inputs of the model. It determines the
domain of interest for the test and it expresses concepts such as If the
input x assumes the value x0...
• Proof: it is placed on the outputs of the model. it determines the expected
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Figure 3.18: State EMERGENZA
Figure 3.19: From state EMERGENZA to state FRENATURA
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Figure 3.20: State FRENATURA
Figure 3.21: From state EMERGENZA to state INTERFACCE AZIONATE
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value for the test. expresses concepts like ...then the output y is y0..
The tool checks if the property is true in the model and otherwise generates
a counterexample. There are also two different strategies for the verification of
the test:
• Prove: translate the model into a formal language and perform a formal
verification on the translated model.
• Find Violations: limits the previous technique to a limited number of steps
established by the user.
Usually the technique that is preferred to use is the Prove one. In cases
where the complexity is too high and the execution of tests fails, the Find Viola-
tion technique can be used as a sort of debug, increasing the confidence on the
model behavior, but without any formal proof on the properties of the model.
A simple requirement is representable with a series of blocks Assumption/Proof
placed on the arcs of the input/output; in more complex cases must instead
ensure that the system is already in a certain state, and this requires further
instrumentation of the model.
The complexity in the verification of a requirement is determined by two charac-
teristics:
• The structure of the hypothesis. A requirement may relate to a simple
combination input and / or a particular state of the system (or a subset
of states). In order to model the hypotesis the adopted technique involves
the creation of special blocks that takes as input the current state of the
system (or other information useful for the property to prove) and bounds
the verification only to the right cases.
• The structure of the thesis. The verification may require the outputs to
observe only the value of output (e.g., the acoustic notification is 'on ')
or to observe a change in the value of the output (e.g., the machine goes
from state A to state B) .
A subset of the management requirements that have been verified through
Prove properties functionality of Simulink Design Verifier is listed below. Note
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that, in order to speed up the verification process, the timing constraints have
been scaled by the same factor (e.g., in the case of the verification of Presenza
PdM, the timing constants have been scaled by a factor 10). Requirements have
been verified both through Assumption/Proof constructs (if requirements were
simple enough) or through a more complex Simulink circuit, when some check
are needed to enable the verification or not.
3.3.3 Simple requirements verification
The first requirement is a simple one, which does not need any elaboration in
order to be verified. This requirement belongs to the class 1 (see 3.2.2).
Req 1: At the activation, the function shall start from state INIZIALIZ-
ZAZIONE
The Simulink model that follows simulate the requirement considering an As-
sumption block with value 1 on the TF input (train stopped), in order to model
the fact that at the activation of the system the train is not moving, and a
proof block with value 0 on the exit State, where 0 is the value for the state
INIZIALIZZAZIONE.
3.3.4 Complex requirements verification
This requirement is complex enough to require the creation of a Simulink circuit
to check the current status of the system before the verification can be actually
performed. This requirement falls in the class 2 requirements (see 3.2.2).
Req. 2: Independently on the current state except for the state FRE-
NATURA, the function shall return in the state INIZIALIZZAZIONE if it
is restored the train stop (TF) condition or if it is currently happening an
emergency braking requested by another function.
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Figure 3.22: Req. 1 verification
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The following Simulink model is used to perform the verification.
Figure 3.23: Req. 2 verification
According to the requirement, the state FRENATURA shall not be involved;
furthermore the two inputs on which the Assumption blocks are places shall
be bonded through the OR logical operation. For this motivation a Simulink
circuit has been designed in order to perform the verification: the EnableProof
block implementes the check for the current state (different from FRENATURA)
and the logical OR between the two inputs that represents the current state of
the braking operation and the train stop (TF) condition. In the Proof block is
modeled the check for the transition to the state INIZIALIZZAZIONE.
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Figure 3.24: Link between EnableProof and Proof blocks for verification of Req. 2
Figure 3.25: EnableProof block for verification of Req. 2
Figure 3.26: Proof block for verification of Req. 2
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3.3.5 Timed-related requirements verification
The following requirements are time related, and thus fall in the class 3 require-
ments (see 3.2.2). Both verification presented below require the creation of a
Simulink circuit to check the current state of the system before the verification
can be enabled, and a more complex check that the system remains in that state:
• for at least a certain amount of time (Req. 6);
• within a certain amount of time (Req. 7).
Req.6: the function shall transit from state EMERGENZA to state FRE-
NATURA if the timers T_vig_min elapses, activating the emergency pro-
cedure Procedura di Emergemza, Proc_Emerg, deactivating the acousitc
notification Suon_5 and activating the recover emergency procedure (Pro-
cedura di Recupero Emergenza, Rec_Proc_Emerg) in order to permit the
re-enabling of the braking functionalities once the train has stopped.
The Simulink model in Fig. 3.27 implements the requirement.
Also for the verification of this requirement the additional two blocks En-
ableProof and Proof have been used in order to model the conditions for verifi-
cations.
In the EnableProof block there is implemented the checks for the current state
to be EMERGENZA and the check for the elapsed time from the last action
of the driver is greater or equal than the requested one T_vig_min. Then the
Proof block implements the check if the current state has become FRENATURA,
and the disabling of the acoustic notifications and the enabling of the emergency
procedure has occurred according to what stated by the requirement.
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Figure 3.27: Req. 6 verification
Figure 3.28: Link between EnableProof and Proof blocks for verification of Req. 6
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Figure 3.29: EnableProof block for verification of Req. 6
Figure 3.30: Proof block for verification of Req. 6
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Req. 7: the function shall transit from state EMERGENZA to state INTER-
FACCE AZIONATE and disable the acoustic notification if the mechanical
interfaces provided to the driver (e.g., button) are pressed and released within
T_funzione time.
Figure 3.31: Verifica Requisito 7
For the verification of this requirement the block EnableProof (Fig. 3.33) is
in charge to check that the button is hold pressed for the right amount of time
([0, T_funzione]); furthermore the block shall also check the current state, that
shall be EMERGENZA. In the Proof block (Fig. 3.34), if the proof is enabled,
it is verified that the transition between state EMERGENZA to INTERFACCE
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AZIONATE and the subsequent disabling of the acoustic notification is performed
accordingly to the requirement specification.
Figure 3.32: Link between EnableProof and Proof blocks for verification of Req. 7
Figure 3.33: EnableProof block for verification of Req. 7
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Figure 3.34: Proof block for verification of Req. 7
CHAPTER 4
Formal Methods for Requirements Specification
GETS has recently introduced formal modeling and code generation by means of
the Simulink/Stateflow platform, and has defined a model-based process com-
pliant with the CENELEC standards, the set of norms and methods to be used
while implementing a railway product for the European market. Simulink/State-
flow are powerful languages for formalizing low-level requirements, while they are
less suitable for high-level system requirements specification and analysis.
These activities were normally performed by GETS using a paper-based approach,
with natural language documents completed by informal diagrams. Natural lan-
guage is inherently ambiguous and a more formal means to express requirements
was desirable.
So the needs of GETS have moved from the MBD approach, which already
became part of the development process, to another level of the development
process, the requirement specification.
The company aimed for:
• A formal notation in requirement and architecture specification;
• Tarceability enforcement;
• Cross-phase integrated documentation;
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In order to fulfill the company requests, the OMG SysML [55] language was
seen as the solution to substitute the traditional text-centric specifications with
a formal notation.
This chapter will report the experience of the experimentation of SysML for a
small-medium project and the lesson learnt during the experimentation.
4.1 The SysML Language
SysML is a graphical modelling language, developed by the OMG [53] and IN-
COSE [39], born in response to the UML for Systems Engineering. It is composed
by a UML Profile that represents a subset of UML 2 [54] with extensions (Fig.
4.1). It supports the specification, analysis, design, verification, and validation
of systems that include hardware, software, data, personnel, procedures, and fa-
cilities.
SysML is a visual modeling that provides semantics and notation, but it shall
not be confused with a methodology or a tool: SysML is methodology and tool
independent.
Figure 4.1: Relationship between SysML and UML
The taxonomy of SysML diagrams with respect to the UML2 one is depicted
in Fig. 4.2.
Each diagram in SysML represents a model element. The Diagram context is
specified in the header, as shown in the Fig. 4.3. The header is thus composed
by:
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• the diagram kind;
• the model element type (package, block, activity, ..);
• model element name;
• user defined diagram name.
Figure 4.2: SysML Taxonomy
Figure 4.3: SysML diagram header
In the following sections we will detail the basic types of diagram provided by
SysML that have been used during the experimentation of the SysML language
applied to the development of safety-critical systems in GETS.
4.1.1 Structural diagrams
Structural diagrams are used in SysML to describe the structure, i.e., the static
part of a system that is intended to be modeled. The structure diagrams are not
Chapter 4. Formal Methods for Requirements Specification 75
suitable for describing the data flow between parts, but only which are the parts
involved in the system construction.
Structural diagrams are:
• package diagrams;
• block definition diagrams (BDD);
• internal block diagrams (IBD).
Package diagram
A Package diagram is used to organize the model, since it groups the model ele-
ments into a name space, allowing to organize the model as a hierarchy or to use
viewpoints to augment model organization (see Fig. 4.4). The viewpoints repre-
sent the view of a certain user of the system, from the stakeholder to the designer.
Figure 4.4: Package diagram - model organization
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Block definition diagrams and Internal block diagrams
The blocks are basic structural elements based on the concept of UML Class.
They provide an unifying concept to describe the structure of an element or a
system. The blocks have associated multiple standard compartments that can
describe the blocks characteristics (e.g., properties, operation, constraints..) as
shown in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Block example
The Block definition diagram (BDD) describes the relationship among blocks,
such as composition, association and specialization; differently, the Internal block
diagram (IBD) describes the internal structure of a block in terms of its properties
and connectors as shown in Fig. 4.6.
Figure 4.6: BDD vs IBD
The Internal block diagram specifies how the blocks are interconnected,
through the usage of connectors and ports as shown in Fig. 4.7. The ports
specify interaction points on blocks and parts, and belongs to two classes (see
Fig. 4.8):
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• standard UML port: specifies a set of required or provided operations
and/or signals;
• flow port: specifies what can flow in or out of block/part.
Figure 4.7: Internal block diagram
Figure 4.8: Classes of ports
4.1.2 Behavioral diagrams
The Behavioral diagrams detail the behavior of the system, i.e., the dynamic part
of the system in terms of interaction between the blocks and the parts of the
system.
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Among the behavioral diagrams, widely used are the Activity diagrams, which
specify the activities, i.e., the transformations of inputs to outputs through con-
trolled sequence of actions (see Fig. 4.9).
The Behavioral diagrams includes also the following UML2 diagrams:
• use cases diagrams, which provide means for describing basic function-
ality of a system in terms of usages/goals of the system by actors;
• sequence diagrams, which provide representations of message based
behavior, representing flow of control and describing interaction between
parts;
• state machine diagrams, that are typically used to represent the life
cycle of a block, through transition between state (modes of operation)
and events (also timed events, unavailable in other types of diagrams).
Figure 4.9: Activity diagram
4.1.3 Cross-cutting constructs
The Cross-cutting constructs available in SysML belong to:
• Allocations
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• Requirements
The Allocations represent general relationship that map one model element
to another. Allocations can be of different types, such as behavioral (function is
allocated to a component), structural (logical is allocated to physical), software
to hardware (see Fig. 4.10), and so on.
Figure 4.10: Software to Hardware allocation example
The Requirements are based on the requirement stereotype that rep-
resents a text based requirement. The stereotype assign an unique identifier
to each requirement among all Requirement diagrams. For each requirement
is also possible to add user defined properties such as verification method for
that requirement, or add user defined requirements categories (e.g., functional
requirement, interface requirement of performance requirement).
SysML defines a visual and graphical representation of textual requirements, spe-
cialised associations between themselves or with other elements of the model, and
how they can be managed in a structured and hierarchical environment. SysML
defines new types of associations (stereotyped dependencies, Fig. 4.11):
• Derivation (DeriveReqt) for requirements that are introduced in conse-
quence of another requirement;
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• Satisfiability (Satisfy) for components (e.g., blocks) that fulfill require-
ment requests;
• Verification (Verify) for diagrams (e.g., activity) that details the verifica-
tion procedure for a given requirement;
• Refinement (Refine) for requirements that refine in greater level of detail
the parent requirement;
Figure 4.11: Requirements breakdown
4.2 The TOPCASED experience
TOPCASED version 3.0.13 [85] was introduced during the experimentation for
the requirements specification of the Failsafe Data Transmission (FDT) system,
a platform that manages the switching of adjacent stations. When two stations
share a single track for a variety of causes (e.g., the other tracks are busy or not
available at the time), the staff of the stations may decide to reverse the direction
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of the track from station A to station B, and vice versa (Fig 4.12) to enable trains
to pass in both directions, once at time. The reversal of the direction requires
that the personnel of the two stations perform a safe procedure; for the whole
duration of the procedure they must keep in phone contact. The FDT system
allows the exchange of the data necessary to complete this procedure between the
two stations, among which is the current occupancy of the track or the current
travel direction.
Figure 4.12: FDT System
The project was small enough (6 persons for 7 months) to introduce a new
technology, and the tool was perceived as the right candidate to practice SysML,
given TOPCASED's claimed orientation to safety-critical systems development.
As an example of such orientation, the tool provides a model validation feature,
that allows the internal consistency of the produced model and its compliance to
the SysML standard to be checked.
A subset of the SysML diagrams was chosen which was considered sufficient to
specify the system with a proper degree of detail. This subset was composed
by use case, requirement, sequence and structure diagrams (i.e., package, block
definition and internal block). The approach planned for the structuring of the
different diagrams was aimed at following the CENELEC V-process phases (Fig.
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4.13), in order to give a graphical evidence of the adherence to this standard.
For this purpose, a single model structured into packages was defined: each
package corresponds to a CENELEC phase and includes the diagrams to fulfill
the norm prescriptions for that phase. For example, the requirements phase in-
cludes mainly use case and requirement diagrams, while the architecture phase
is essentially documented with block definition and internal block diagrams. The
model was built incrementally, and each artifact of each phase was traced to the
elements coming from the previous one.
Figure 4.13: TopCased packages for FDT project
The SysML language appeared rather intuitive to users with a UML back-
ground, and the tool was easy to learn for people with confidence with the Eclipse
platform. In general, electronic/telecommunications engineers encountered more
hurdles than software engineers, since some basic principles of the model-view-
controller pattern are required for a proficient usage of the technologies. These
problems were increased by the absence of a proper documentation for the tool.
Despite the large literature on SysML, there was no complete tutorial to guide
people that were new to both the tool and the language. Furthermore, the no-
tation of internal block diagrams supported by the tool was not compliant to the
one presented by the text chosen as a reference [55], and this caused a limited
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use of these diagrams.
Another issue was the stability of the tool. While the model was growing in size,
the tool became slower and more prone to crashes, especially with the increasing
number of traceability links between different diagrams. Though this drawback
could be associated to the usage of a single model to formalize the whole process,
this situation was felt as really frustrating, and led the team to mistrust the tool.
As a consequence, many advanced features, such as the collaborative usage, were
not experimented. The initial plan was indeed to allow the independent update
of the model by different actors in different process phases, but ultimately it was
the project leader that took care of the integration of the whole model, according
to the input of the other participants.
The final step has been the generation of the documentation. HTML was the
preferred format, since with a plain document one would have lost the traceability
among artifacts, instead preserved by the hyperlinks. Nevertheless, this choice
was criticized by the validation team, on the basis that the format would not have
been accepted by the assessors 1: with a structured document one has a guided
direction of reading and understanding, while with HTML one has to choose
the navigation path, with the consequent problems of overall uptake. Since the
plain document generation capability of the tool was found insufficient, the team
had to re-write the documentation by hand, including the SysML diagrams as
figures. At this point there were two document sets to maintain, with imaginable
versioning problems, and since the SysML models already had their role for the
development of the platform, it was decided to keep the textual documentation
as the main reference for further changes.
Despite the goal of a complete renewal of the specification and documentation
approach was not achieved, the experience did not result in a total failure. The
SysML requirement diagrams, used for structuring natural language requirements,
have a poor semantics with few connectors (it is not even possible to define re-
quirements with boolean logic relations), and do not give too much added value
in themselves with respect to structured paper requirements. However, the pos-
sibility to clarify these requirements with other formal diagrams, and to perform
mutual tracing, gave a consistent support in requirements disambiguation and
1Third-part companies that certify compliance to the CENELEC standard
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early discovery of underspecification. The participants agreed that the aid of
use case and sequence diagrams as a mean for communication between the re-
quirements manager and the developers simplified the understanding of natural
language requirements and increased the level of confidence on the intended
behaviour of the system during the implementation. Furthermore, the SysML
model worked as a centralized reference for the other activities (e.g., sw/hw de-
velopment, tests) during the whole project, representing a useful process control
tool for the project leader. For these reasons the SysML language survived within
the development process of the company, while the TOPCASED tool was soon
abandoned in favor of the commercial tool MagicDraw [52].
4.3 The adoption of SysML formal language
As stated before, the need for SysML support came when the systems produced
by the company started to radically increase in terms of complexity (to have an
idea, when the number of lines of code exceeded 100.000).
SysML have been thus introduced in the initial phases of the development pro-
cess. The company has defined the current role of SysML in the process, shown
schematically in figure 4.14, as follows.
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Figure 4.14: SysML role in the requirements definition process
Right after requirement elicitation, requirements appear like unstructured
post-it notes in the blackboard of the requirements manager. High-level sys-
tem requirements are identified among this initial set, and are expressed in the
form of SysML requirement diagrams. These diagrams allow specifying hierarchi-
cal relationships and dependencies among single requirements, and the chaotic
post-it view is replaced by a structured graph-like model.
Then, block diagrams are employed to specify the interfaces of the system mod-
ules that are supposed to implement the requirements. An approach based on de-
composition is adopted, which allows specializing each module into sub-modules
towards the actual implementation. Each module has some high-level require-
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ments apportioned to it. If needed, requirements are also refined into lower-level
requirements when modules are specialized.
The SysML models are structured into packages residing in a single root model.
Each package corresponds to a phase of the V-based development process pre-
scribed by the CENELEC norm for railway safety-critical systems [10]. Therefore,
there is a well defined mapping between process phases and the diagrams that
have been used in each phase. SysML could be in principle employed also to de-
fine the behaviour of the actual implementation and to generate code. However,
modelling and simulation at behavioural level is much faster and more flexible
with Simulink/Stateflow, and the generated code has higher quality. Therefore,
the role of SysML ends at the software architecture level.
4.4 Lesson learned
At the end of the project the general opinion was that using an open-source
tool to perform core activities in a company with time-to-market pressure and
certification constraints was not a good option for two main reasons:
• Companies prefer products with a limited but stable number of function-
alities, while lively maintained opensource tools such as TOPCASED tend
to have several experimental features that are progressively tuned by the
community according to the users feedback.
• Companies require a direct interface with the tool providers that takes the
responsibility if a problem occurs with the tool usage. The choice of Magic
Draw was driven by these considerations, and the tool actually confirmed
the expectations of a more stable, documented and customer-supported
platform.
Nevertheless, the initial goal of passing from text-centric specifications, with
diagrams clarifying the text, to diagram-centric ones, with notes accompanying
the models, was missed again. Today the company is proficiently employing the
Magic Draw platoform on large projects, intensively exploiting collaborative us-
age features and with a generally good opinion of the tool maturity level, but still
all the official specifications required by the CENELEC norms are manually edited
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natural language documents. Assessors normally enter at the end of the develop-
ment process to validate compliance with the standards, and require paper-like
documents in order to have a complete picture of the activities performed by the
company. While this implies a major effort in terms of production and mainte-
nance of the documentation, it turns out that the investment on SysML pays off
in terms of increased confidence on the quality of the specifications.
CHAPTER 5
The Renewed Development Process
This chapter is a critical review of the introduction of advanced software design
and verification technologies inside GETS, within a collaboration with the Uni-
versity of Florence. This introduction included the experiences reported in the
previous chapters, as well as other PhD experiences, which contributed to the
renewal of the development process of General Electric Transportation Systems
that is described below.
The transition from a code-based process to a model-based process is not easy.
This is particularly true for a company that operates in a safety-critical sector,
where the products shall be developed according to international standards, with
certified tools and controlled processes.
In this chapter, it will be summarised the experience of a railway signalling
manufacturer that decided to adopt general purpose model-based tools, namely
Simulink/Stateflow and SysML, for the development of its products. The faced
challenges primarily concerned the verification of the software and the integration
of the tools within the existing process. Structured development solutions and
formal/semi-formal approaches (i.e., semantics restrictions, model-based testing,
and abstract interpretation) were adopted to tackle the challenges. The chapter
summarise the lessons learnt during this paradigm-shift, with particular focus on
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the benefits and drawbacks of automatic code generation.
General Electric Transportation Systems (GETS), signalling division of Florence,
is a medium-size railway signalling manufacturer. About ten years ago, given the
rising interest of safety-critical industries in formal methods[77], the company de-
cided to start experimenting with formal modelling and verification. To this end,
experts were contacted from the university to support the initial experiments,
and a strict collaboration have been established in order to develop further the
topic of formal methods applied to development process.
Several formal tools were evaluated, but the preference of the developers fell on
a semi-formal toolsuite, namely Simulink/Stateflow [82]. The Simulink language
uses a block notation for the definition of continuous-time dynamic systems. The
Stateflow notation is based on Harel's Statecharts [36] and supports the mod-
elling and animation of event-based discrete-time applications. Simulink block
diagrams can be used as a framework to compose Stateflow statecharts, as it
is mostly the case for the systems developed by GETS. The main reasons that
drove the choice were:
• the large amount of packages available with the toolsuite - packages that
could be employed throughout the whole development process;
• the widespread knowledge about the tools found within the company and
the corporation.
Initially, the models designed through Simulink/Stateflow were used solely for
requirements elicitation. In 2007, the company was attracted by the possibility of
using such models also for code generation. One year after, this technology was
already part of the development process. However, changing the development
paradigm from code-based to model-based required changes also in the verifica-
tion activities. Model-based testing and abstract interpretation were adopted in
the following projects, and strict language restrictions were introduced to con-
strain the semi-formal semantics of the toolsuite to a formal semantics [26].
The new model-based approach allowed to speed-up the development, and, most
of all, gave the possibility to handle more complex systems. As the projects
grew in size, new technologies were required to rigorously handle the system
requirements and the architecture level of the development. SysML, a unified
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modelling language for system development, was selected as the proper tech-
nology to address this issue. After three years of experience with SysML, the
company has established a formal development approach that integrates SysML
and Simulink/Stateflow.
5.1 Challenges
During the story briefly summarized and the experimentation of new formal meth-
ods applied to the development of safety-critical systems in GETS, several chal-
lenges have been faced that deserve some attention.
Modelling Language Restriction
The code used in safety-critical systems shall conform to specific safety stan-
dards, and normally the companies use coding guidelines to avoid usage of im-
proper constructs that might be harmful from the safety point of view. When
modelling and auto-coding are adopted, the generated code shall conform to the
same standard asked to the hand-crafted code. The adopted code generator,
named Simulink Coder, induces a tight relation between the generated code and
the modelling language constructs employed. Hence, the identification of a safe
subset of the modelling language is required to enable the production of code
that is compliant with the guidelines, and that can be succesfully integrated with
the existing one. The approach adopted by the company was first to define an
internal set of modelling guidelines for Simulink/Stateflow. The guidelines were
practical recommendations on the usage of the language constructs. The idea
was that the C code generated from models following the guidelines would be
compliant with the coding standard of the company. The initial guidelines were
based on the analysis of the code that was generated from a model previously
designed for requirement elicitation. This preliminary set had the limit of being
derived from a specific model, and could lack of generality. Therefore, in the
projects that followed, the set was extended with other recommendations bor-
rowed from the automotive domain (i.e., the MAAB guidelines) [24].
In order to ease formal analysis, it was finally decided to complete the modelling
style guidelines by restricting the Stateflow language to a semantically unambigu-
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ous set. To this end, the studies of Scaife et al. [67], focused on translating a
subset of Stateflow into the Lustre formal language, have been used [28]. Models
currently developed by the company are therefore independent from the simu-
lation engine, and this choice has actually open the door to formal verification
[26].
Generated Code Correctness
Safety-critical norms, such as the CENELEC EN 50128, the European standard
for railway software [10], ask for a certified or proven-in-use translator. In absence
of such a tool, like in the case of the available code generators for Simulink/S-
tateflow, a strategy has to be defined to ensure that the code behaviour is fully
compliant to the model behaviour, and no additional improper functions are
added during the code synthesis phase. The objective is to perform the verifica-
tion activities at the level of the abstract model, minimizing or automating the
operations on the code.
The company has adopted a model-based testing approach called translation
validation [17], completed by static analysis by means of abstract interpretation
[18]. With translation validation one executes test scenarios based on functional
objectives at the model level. Then, he repeats the same tests on the generated
code, checking that the outputs of model and corresponding code are consistent.
As a final step, in order to ensure runtime error freedom, the Polyspace tool is
employed to perform abstract interpretation (see [27] [34] [28] for the details).
This technology verifies the correctness of a program on an overapproximation
of the range of the program variables.
The certification authorities have considered the overall approach suitable to by-
pass the tool qualification required by the safety regulations. It should be noticed
that the railway norms are not as specific about tool qualification as, for example,
the avionic ones [42]. Therefore, companies in the railway sector are required to
agree upon possible strategies with the certification authorities.
Multiple Formalisms
Safety-critical systems are normally large, complex platforms with several inter-
acting units and architectural layers. To manage such complexity, their devel-
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opment is based on multiple levels of abstraction, and different models with
different granularities are required. Indeed, a model that is used for code gen-
eration is hardly usable to reason at system design level. Simulink/Stateflow do
not support a flexible hierarchical development approach, and system designers
need to adopt other modelling languages that can express the higher abstractions
inherently required by the process.
In the experience of the company, this issue has been addressed through the
adoption of the SysML language [55].
Process integration
Product development is performed by companies by means of processes, which
define a framework made of tasks, artifacts and people. Introduction of new
technologies in an established process requires adjustments to the process struc-
ture, which shall maintain its coherence even if changes are applied. This is
particularly true in the case of safety-critical companies, whose products have
to be validated according to normative prescriptions. Hence, a sound process
shall be defined in order to integrate modelling and code generation within the
existing framework.
An enhanced V-based process has been defined, as depicted in Fig. 5.1. The
process embeds two verification branches: one for the activities performed on
the models, and the other for the tasks concerning source code and system. In
the figure, we highlight the parts that strictly concern software development -
based on Simulink/Stateflow modelling - and the parts that are related to system
development - based on SysML modelling. The two process fragments overlap in
the SW Requirements phase and in the SW Model Architecture phase. Indeed,
software requirements are expressed in SysML, as well as the software architec-
ture. An equivalent architecture is expressed through Simulink in the form of
interacting blocks, which are the functional modules (i.e., the components) of
the model. SysML requirements are manually traced to the Simulink model. In
the Model Module Design phase, the Simulink blocks are refined into Stateflow
statecharts.
It is worth noting that the process is somehow adaptable to both manual coding
and to auto-coding. After the SysML modelling activities, one can decide to
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Figure 5.1: The renewed development process
adopt either hand-crafted code or Simulink/Stateflow modelling to develop the
application. Indeed, in some applications (e.g., firmware, systems with limited
software, platform with strong dependencies from legacy code), the code gener-
ation technology is considered not convenient, and hand-crafted code is normally
employed.
5.2 Lesson learnt
Facing the challenges of model-based development and formal methods adoption
for the overall development process, made the company learn some important
lessons, detailed in the following paragraphs.
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Abstraction
Models allow working at a higher level of abstraction, and they can be manip-
ulated better than code. The company experienced the actual relevance of this
statement in the transition from code-based to model-based testing. The model-
based testing approach adopted has allowed defining behavioural test scenarios
at component level without disrupting the model structure. This approach would
have been impracticable on hand-crafted code. Indeed, with hand-crafted code,
it is common to perform tests on single functions, while it is more complex to
identify the functions that participate to the behaviour of a software component.
With models, one builds the system already in terms of components. Therefore,
identification and testing of components comes in a natural way.
The company learnt also that abstraction is a delicate concept that has to be
carefully handled. The proper degree of abstraction has to be identified in order
for an artifact to be useful. For example, in the initial experience with SysML,
requirement diagrams with natural language requirements were adopted through-
out the process until the lowest level of model detail. At this point, their content
was basically equivalent to the Simulink/Stateflow models. The level of abstrac-
tion of such requirements had to be raised, since they appeared to be redundant
and any slight modification to the models would have implied a modification to
the requirements.
Expressiveness
Graphical models are closer to the natural language requirements. At the same
time, they are an unambiguous mean to exchange or pass artifacts among devel-
opers. This observation has been enlightened by the main model-based develop-
ment experience of the company reported in [26], where the project passed from
the hands of its first main developer to another developer within one month only
and with very limited support.
The previous experience of the company was that, if someone was the father
of a piece of software, he would have remained the one and only repository of
the knowledge for that software. This is a common problem in many small and
average size companies. It negatively affects both the company itself, which has
to rely on a single person to actually modify and reuse the software, and the
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developer, who normally wish to extend his competencies to go beyond his initial
fragment of code.
Cohesion and decoupling
The automatically generated software is composed by modules with higher in-
ternal cohesion and better decoupling with respect to manual coding. Interfaces
among functionalities are based solely on data, and the control-flow is simplified
since there is no cross-call among different modules. Decoupling and well-defined
interfaces have helped in easing the outsourcing of the modelling activity, which
is a relevant aspect in the development of products that have to tackle time-to-
market issues.
Uniformity
The generated code has a repetitive structure, which facilitates the automation
of the verification activities. When strict modelling guidelines are defined, one
could look at the generated code as if it would be the software always written
by the same programmer. Therefore, any code analysis task can be tailored
on the artificial programmer's design habits. As a witness for this observation,
consider that the abstract interpretation procedure adopted to reveal runtime
errors resulted actually profitable on the generated code only, since systematic
analysis on hand-crafted code was made harder by its variable structure and
programming style.
Uniformity is guaranteed also at the process level with the support of SysML.
Employing a unified modelling language - and a single tool - in great part of the
development phases eases all those activities that involve the interfaces among
the phases. Indeed, in a V-based process, the output artifact of a phase is
the input artifact for the following one. The use of SysML has somehow made
rigorous this handing over.
Traceability
Software modules are directly traceable with the corresponding blocks of the
specification modelled with Simulink/Stateflow. Traceability is a relevant issue
in the development of safety-critical systems, since any error has to be traced
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back to the process task, or artifact defect, that produced it. The structured
development approach introduced, with the support of the Simulink/Stateflow
toolsuite, has allowed defining navigable links between the single code statements
and the requirements.
At the SysML level, traceability involves the links between requirements diagrams
and related SysML diagrams. Traceability links are manually defined through sim-
ple drag and drop operations, and traceability matrixes are automatically gen-
erated. In a traditional process, traceability matrixes are manually edited, with
no tool support and consequent maintainability issues. In the experience of the
company, when change requests are issued by a customer, they normally involve
system-level requirements. The tool support available with a model-based ap-
proach allows tracing the changes from such requirements to the module-level
requirements and the corresponding models. Therefore, both the developers and
the requirements managers have a complete view of the impact of the change
requests. Instead, in a traditional process, one would have to inspect the trace-
ability matrix and check the artifacts that are affected by the change request, an
activity that can be rather time consuming and error prone (unless supported by
proper automated tools).
Automatic traceability support between SysML and Simulink/Stateflow models
is still an open issue, since there is currently no tool that implements such a
feature.
Documentation
For safety-critical systems, the official documentation associated to each process
phase and artifact is as important as the actual system. The certification of
these product is mainly based on the inspection of such a documentation by an
external authority. It is therefore important to have a documentation that is
formal, expressive and up-to-date with the product status. In the process cur-
rently implemented by the company, both SysML and Simulink/Stateflow models
are used to provide documentation for the process artifacts. Simulink/Stateflow
models with proper comments are used to automatically generate the software
documentation. Hence, documentation and software are totally aligned. On
the other hand, SysML diagrams are integrated into the manually edited docu-
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mentation. Documents can be automatically generated from SysML as HTML
pages, but certification authorities normally require to have paper-like documents
focused on text, rather than navigable HTML documents with SysML models.
The main reason is that the certification authority normally enters at the end of
the development process to validate compliance with the standards, and wants
to analyse the process as a sequential history - a paper-like document - and not
as an interwoven graph of HTML pages.
The integration of the SysML models into the documents poses maintainability
issues. Indeed, if the model changes, the change is not automatically reflected
by the documentation. However, the one-to-one correspondence between SysML
packages and process phases - and associated documents - eases the manual up-
date of the documentation. Furthermore, the traceability links between models
in different packages helps the maintenance of the cross dependencies among
documents. When a model is changed, the model package clearly identifies the
document that has to be modified. Then, one can follow the traceability links to
retrieve the other models that are affected by the change. Such models belong to
packages with associated documents. Hence, the link among models indirectly
create a relationships among documents, and the overall SysML model becomes
a sort of navigable index for the process documentation.
Verification cost
The introduction of the new development process has allowed the reduction of
the cost of the verification activities, while ensuring greater confidence on the
product safety. When passing from traditional code unit testing based on struc-
tural coverage objectives, to testing based on functional objectives aided with
abstract interpretation, it was possible to reduce the verification cost of about
70%. The new approach was comparable to the previous one in terms compli-
ance to the CENELEC EN 50128 requirements on verification, but resulted much
more cost-effective [27].
Though consistent cost improvements have been achieved, manual test definition
is still the bottleneck of the process, requiring about 60-70% of the whole unit-
level verification cost. Preliminary experiments with formal verification applied
at unit-level have shown that this technology might considerably reduce the veri-
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fication cost for the majority of the requirements. Indeed, the recent experiments
with formal verification by means of Simulink Design Verifier have shown that
the verification cost can be further reduced by 50-66% [26].
Control
The structured development has allowed achieving greater control over the com-
ponents and, finally, to produce software with less bugs as the input to the
verification activities. This is witnessed by the number of bugs found by ver-
ification, which decreased from 10 to 3 bugs per module when the company
introduced a rigorous model-based process.
Complexity
The main drawback encountered in introducing code generation has been the
size and overall complexity of the resulting software. Though these aspects
were not complicating the verification activities, they posed challenges from the
performance point of view.
Real-time constraints for railway signalling systems are not so demanding as
are for other kinds of embedded systems, and the typically required response
times are in the range of hundreds of milliseconds. However they are reactive
systems that, might a failure occur, shall activate failure recovery procedures in
a limited amount of time in order to reach the safe state. The reaction time
is influenced by the main execution time. In the first experiments with code
generation this execution time resulted four times higher compared to the time
required by the execution of the corresponding hand-crafted code. In order not
to abandon the advantages of auto-coding, in the discussed case an hardware
upgrade actually solved the problem. However, during the design of new, more
complex systems, this issue has to be taken into account while defining the
hardware architecture. The hardware designer shall consider that the code is
larger in size, and there is less flexibility in terms of optimizations at source
level (we recall that optimizations at compiler level are not recommended for the
development of safety-critical systems): when designing the platform, a larger
amount of memory has to be planned if one wants to employ automatic code
generation.
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Knowledge Transfer
Some lessons have been learned also from the knowledge transfer point of view.
The research activity has been performed according to the following research
management model. On one side there is a research assistant who comes from
the university and is fully focused on the technology to be introduced. On the
other side there is an internal development team, which puts the research into
practice on real projects when the exploratory studies are successful.
The results obtained during this experience would have not been possible through
intermittent collaborations only. Moreover, they would have been hardly achieved
if just an internal person would have been in charge of the research. In order
to separate the research from the time-to-market issues, the independence of
the research assistant from the development team has to be preserved. Large
companies can profit from dedicated internal research teams, or even entire re-
search divisions. Instead, medium-size companies often have to employ the same
personnel for performing research explorations, which are always needed to stay
on the market, and for taking care of the day-by-day software development. We
argue that the research management model adopted in the presented experience,
based on an academic researcher independently operating within a company, can
be adapted to other medium-size companies with comparable results.
5.3 Remarks
General Electric Transportation Systems was able to understand the benefits of
a model-based process aided with formal methods especially thanks to the initial
enthusiasm associated to code generation. Such technology showed its potentials
in few months, and its adoption was straightforward. Then, a butterfly-effect in
the process occurred that brought to the adoption of other techniques, such as
model-based testing, abstract interpretation and system modelling with SysML.
Formal verification is not part of the GETS development process yet. We can
observe that nevertheless formal verification with model checking is often the
subject of the first experiments of companies with something formal, especially
in the safety-critical systems domain. In many cases, they did not go much
further than these initial experiments, notwithstanding the achieved evidence
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of lower verification costs. Indeed, the adoption of formal verification without
intermediate steps is not common: the difficulties related to the steep learning
curve required by formal methods often tend to discourage industrial practitioners
and managers, who need to see the evidence of productivity gains within short
time. The reported experience shows that may be more effective to start with
less formal tasks (i.e., code generation), and later adopt more formal tasks, such
as verification, when the company has matured a full awareness of the actual
benefits of being formal.
Conclusions
The work presented in this dissertation is the result of a research activity aimed
to introduce formal methods and code generation techniques in the development
process of a railway signalling manufacturer, the General Electric Transportation
Systems (GETS) [30], Intelligent Control Systems, division of Florence.
The introduction of new development methodologies in a consolidated process is
not a straightforward step: GETS operates in a CENELEC [9] regulated context,
and every modification in the development process is likely to be followed by
modifications in the verification and validation activities.
At the beginning of the research activity GETS was already experimenting the
Model-Based Design (MBD) and code generation by means of Simulink/State-
flow, as result of another PhD research [28]. The issue that the company was
facing at that moment was mostly related to the validation of the generated code,
and to the integration of the MBD in the existing development process. In order
to address this issue, GETS required the support of the Computer Engineering
department of the University of Florence.
The code generator provided by the Simulink/Stateflow tool-suite is not certi-
fied according to the CENELEC EN 50128 [10]; since the norms ask for a certifid
or proven-in-use translator, a strategy has to be defined in order to assess the
equivalence between the model and generated code behaviour. The proposed
strategy was to fulfill the requirements of the proven-in-use criterion. As a core
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part of the process to achieve the proven-in-use property for the translator, it was
useful to introduce a technique named translation validation [17]: this technique
consists in verifying the functional equivalence between models and generated
software by executing the same tests on the model and the code, and afterwards
performing further structural analysis to ensure that no additional functionality
has been introduced [4]. The Model-Based Testing (MBT) approach that was
finally adopted as part of new verification process was an implementation of the
translation validation technique. A framework called 2M-TVF, that stands for
Matlab Model Translation Validation Framework, fully automated and integrated
with the Simulink/Stateflow environment was developed during the experimen-
tation to perform the MBT and the code validation process.
The introduction of abstract interpretation [34] led to a further improvement in
terms of development time and verification accuracy.
According to the experience, the cost of formal modeling is slighty higher than
manual coding (aboout 30%). This workload increase is partly due to the fact
that graphic editing is inherently slower than textual editing, and partly to the
training cost required by the technological shift. Nevertherless, the case study
shows that this greater effort is payed back by the cost reduction of the code
verification activities (about 70% in total, with respect to a manual coding based
process) and by the increased confidence on the product safety and quality.
Simulink/Stateflow are suitable for formalizing low-level requirements, but they
are less usable for high-level system requirements specification and analysis.
GETS decided to introduce modeling techniques also at a higher level of the
development process, in order to substitute the paper-based approach, with nat-
ural language documents, inherently ambiguous, completed by informal diagrams,
with a more formal one. The OMG SysML language [55] was seen as the solution
to substitute the traditional text-centric specifications with a formal notation.
The opensource tool TOPCASED was chosen to perform the first experimen-
tation with SysML in a real project, namely the FDT project. SysML model
revealed to be a useful process control tool for the project leader. Anyway using
an open-source tool to perform core activities in a company with time-to-market
pressure was not considered the best choice, mostly for the absence of support
and problems related to the tool stability. For these reasons the SysML language
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survived within the development process of the company, while the TOPCASED
tool was soon abandoned in favor of the commercial tool MagicDraw [52].
The new development process [29] is the result of a long-term effort in in-
troducing formal methods within the company. All the technologies used in
the development of the various projects (Metrô Rio project (2009-2011), FDT
project (2010-2011)), namely formal modeling, code generation, model-based
testing and abstract interpretation, passed a three-stage exam before becoming
an internal standard. First, they have been evaluated on an actual product, but
oine with respect to the development process, then they have been introduced
as part of pilot projects and finally they have been refined and adopted. Formal
verification, experimented in the context of Metrô Rio project, is still at the first
stage. The possibility of a further reduction of the unit-level verification costs
encourages the company to invest in this direction, and activities are currently
performed to prepare the subsequent stages. Concerning the formal methods ap-
plied to the requirements and architecture specification, the experience of GETS
has shown that SysML is an appropriate specification mean in a safety-critical
context, but informal natural language is still fundamental to support the evi-
dence that a formal process has been followed.
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